Department of Defence Human Resource Strategy 2010: Edition 2
Since the establishment of the Department of Defence (DOD) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) on 27 April 1994, a corporate transformation process has been underway to migrate from the pre-1994 defence dispensation to a new dispensation as envisaged by the Constitution, the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review. Since then, much progress has been made on many fronts and the DOD / SANDF is organisationally and otherwise, vastly different compared to the situation of only a few years ago.
The majority of the change imperatives identified in the Constitution, the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review have a direct or indirect influence on the DODís human resource (HR) environment. Many of the changes already implemented, specifically within the HR environment, were the result of the negotiated settlement rather than the outcome of a co-ordinated and planned strategy. Many changes have been beneficial and have significantly contributed towards transformation, for example the definite progress towards representivity. However, many changes have also had side effects that impact negatively on the readiness, output and efficiency of the SANDF. Some of the primary negative effects, in no particular order of importance, include the ineffective implementation of the current service system that has led to the ageing and stagnation of large numbers of members especially at lower rank-levels, low morale and loss of expertise, perceptions of a lack of discipline, a lack of rejuvenation of the SANDFís human resource composition, a lack of enabling mechanisms to facilitate a constant throughput of members, deteriorating health status and representivity imbalances at certain levels and in certain musterings.
The development of a coherent HR strategy to give direction to the management of the DODís HR over the medium to long term (ie over the next ten years) is hampered by uncertainty regarding the nature, appropriateness and affordability of the developing force design, force structure and establishment table. The DODís HR strategy should ideally be informed by a relatively stable force design, force structure and establishment table.
Critical decisions and action to provide strategic HR direction can, however, not wait until definitive decisions are reached on steady end-state issues such as the force design and force structure. The DOD requires a coherent HR strategy now to
- empower commanders and managers with a framework and guidelines within which to manage current HR and prepare to manage future HR;
- facilitate efficient HR planning, including budgeting, over the medium term;
- allay the uncertainty and low-morale among personnel by providing a clear statement of intent regarding the direction the DOD is to take with its HR;
- align the DODís HR management with any other actions required to ensure that the DOD can accomplish its mission, meet stakeholder demands, increase its output, utilise its assets efficiently and continuously regenerate itself;
- inform the development of other strategies by stating which expectations are realistically attainable and sustainable within the HR domain; and
- contribute towards the turning around of the DOD to become a winning organisation which is strengthened, rather than burdened, by its HR corps.
AOT : Administrative, Operational and Technical
CHA : Concurrent Health Assessment
CSS : Core Service System
DOD : Department of Defence
D Pers Acq : Directorate Personnel Acquisition
ETD : Education, Training and Development
EIP : Employer Initiated Package
FTC : Full-Time Component
FSS : Flexible Service System
HR : Human Resource
IMS : Initial Military Service
JSCSP : Joint Senior Command and Staff Program
LTS : Long Term Service
MTS : Medium Term Service
MSD : Military Skills Development System
NCO : Non Commissioned Officer
PSAP : Public Service Act Personnel
PDSC : Plenary Defence Staff Council
RPP : Rural Protection Plan
RegF : Regular Force
ResF : Reserve Forces
ROTC : Reserve Officers Training Corps
RDP : Reconstruction and Development Program
SANDF : South African National Defence Force
STS : Short Term Service
SDP : Strategic Defence Package
SADF : South African Defence Force
SA Army : South African Army
SAMHS : South African Military Health Service
SAAF : South African Airforce
SAPS : South African Police Service
SAQA : South African Qualifications Authority
SCS : Senior Career System
SAN : South African Navy
VSP : Voluntary Severance Package
YFTP : Youth Foundation Training Program
RANKS IN THE SANDF
Col/Capt (SAN) : Colonel/Captain (SAN)
Lt Col/Cdr (SAN) : Lieutenant Colonel/Commander (SAN)
Maj/Lt Cmdr (SAN) : Major/Lieutenant Commander (SAN)
Capt/Lt (SAN) : Captain/Lieutenant (SAN)
Lt/S Lt (SAN) : Lieutenant/Sub-Lieutenant (SAN)
2Lt/Esn (SAN) : Second Lieutenant/Ensign (SAN)
WO 1 : Warrant Officer Class 1
WO 2 : Warrant Officer Class 2
S Sgt/F Sgt (SAAF)/CPO (SAN) : Staff Sergeant/Flight Sergeant (SAAF)/Chief
Petty Officer (SAN)
Sgt/PO (SAN) : Sergeant/Petty Officer (SAN)
Cpl/L Smn (SAN) : Corporal/Leading Seaman (SAN)
L Cpl/AB (SAN) : Lance Corporal/Able Seaman (SAN)
Pte/Sea (SAN)/Amn (SAAF) : Private/Seaman (SAN)/Airman (SAAF)
CHAPTER 1 Ė STRATEGIC DIRECTION
It is intended that this HR strategy should
- provide strategic direction to the DOD HR process over the period 2001 to 2010;
- provide the baseline for subsequent HR planning and the development of derived HR sub-strategies, policies and instructions in order to execute this strategy;
- constitute a part of the DOD corporate strategy;
- be a "living" document and be amended as and when required to support the Military Strategy and force design;
- be based on consensus among all principal internal stakeholders and relevant external stakeholders on the strategic direction of HR management in the DOD; and
- be promulgated and communicated appropriately to allay any uncertainty regarding the strategic direction of HR management in the DOD.
The aim of the DOD HR Strategy 2010 is to ensure the establishment of the most effective, efficient and economic Defence HR composition, of the right quantity and quality in the right places at the right times.
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE AIM
The aim introduces the following "first principles" upon which this strategy is founded:
- "Effective". "Effective" means that the DODís HR should be optimally managed to ensure the achievement of predetermined outputs / outcomes.
- "Efficient". "Efficient" means that the DODís HR should function and produce effectively with the least waste of effort, thereby leading to the optimal translation of HR inputs into service delivery outputs.
- "Economic". "Economic" means that the DODís HR composition should be structured in such a way that the cheapest option is entertained for the given quantity and quality of inputs.
- "Right quantity". "Right quantity" means that the number of personnel should be adequate, appropriate and affordable to execute the DODís mission. The "right quantity" therefore implies that the DOD should have effective, efficient and economical ratios for the Full-time Component vs the Reserve Force; the Regulars vs the Reserve Force; the Regulars vs Public Service Act Personnel; rank levels; salary levels; post levels; tooth-to-tail (ie combat vs support) balance; corps and musterings; duplication of structures and span of control. The "right quantity" also means that the DODís human resource composition should be broadly representative of the RSAís demographic composition at all levels and in all musterings and post classes, as stated in the Defence Review, Chapter 10, par 55, ie 64,6% Africans, 10,2% Coloureds, 0,75% Asians and 24,3% Whites.
- "Right quality". "Right quality" means that the DODís personnel should be competent (ie possess the required knowledge, skills and attitude) to effectively, efficiently and economically execute the DODís mission, as well as the functions and tasks of the posts in which they are staffed. The "right quality" furthermore implies that the DODís HR composition must comply with the stated and/or desired criteria pertaining to, among other factors, representivity (ie reflecting the broad demographic composition of the RSAís population at all levels and in all musterings and post classes), age-rank norms, health status and an optimal distribution among the SANDFís service system components. The "right quality" also entails that SANDF members should be educated in Civic Education and comply with the political, ethical and behavioural requirements of military professionalism, including respect for the democratic political process, human rights and cultural diversity. Finally, "the right quality" entails that members should comply with the requirements of military discipline contained in the Defence Act and Military Disciplinary Code and as required by legitimate commands and orders and the adherence to a professional military culture.
- "Right places". "Right places" means that personnel must be optimally educated, trained and developed (ito the "Just Enough, Just in Time" competence acquisition doctrine), staffed and utilised according to the organisationís needs. Individualsí profiles should match the requirements of the posts in which they serve throughout their tenure.
- "Right times". "Right times" means that, at any given moment, personnel should be staffed and utilised according to their ability and aspirations, as well as the organisationís needs.
The terminology used in this document is mostly self-explanatory. The following terms with their meanings are, however, provided to clarify specific concepts:
- Broad Demographic Composition. Broad demographic composition means that the DODís human resource composition should at all levels and in all musterings and post classes, broadly comply with the Defence Review guidelines for representivity, with particular reference to race composition, ie 64,6% Africans, 10,2% Coloureds, 0,75% Asians and 24,3% Whites. Due to the geographic concentration of certain population groups in the provinces (eg the Western Cape with regard to Coloureds and Kwa-Zulu Natal with regard to Asians), due to the voluntary nature of military service and due to membersí preference for serving in certain Services, the Defence Review guidelines for race representivity will not be 100 % attainable within each mustering and each unit. Broad representivity, reflecting an equitable population group distribution should, however, manifest at all levels and in all musterings.
- Downsizing. Downsizing means the reduction of the DODís overall personnel numbers.
- Exit Management Framework. An exit management framework means a Public Service-wide employer-initiated compulsory personnel severance mechanism and process.
- Full-Time Component. The Full-Time Component (FTC) of the DOD includes all uniformed members belonging to the Regular Force (RegF) as well as all Public Service Act (ie civilian) Personnel (PSAP).
- Redeployment. Redeployment refers to a mechanism and process bmo which SANDF personnel are to be re-skilled, re-trained, transferred or be placed in alternative occupations outside the DOD in other State departments, para-statal entities or the private sector.
- Regular Force. The RegF includes all members serving in the Initial Military Service (IMS), Short Term Service (STS), Medium Term Service (MTS) and Long Term Service (LTS).
- Rightsizing. Rightsizing means the adjustment of the internal composition and ratios of the DODís HR composition, eg rightsizing ito race and gender and rightsizing ito the "sharp end" (combat personnel) vs the "blunt end" (support personnel).
The methodology adopted is that this strategy should not have a predominantly theoretical focus. The strategy has been informed by studying international best practice defence HR management models, such as that of Germany and the United Kingdom. It is, however, based upon a practical analysis of the current DOD HR context and realities as well as the provisioning of strategic direction based upon appropriate solutions for the unique situation of the DOD, to guide HR management over the next ten years. The focus is on the predominant systems, processes and issues which drive, or significantly influence, the "provide HR process", from a strategic perspective.
The strategy itself is based on the premise that it must provide solutions to solve the main HR problem areas which, if not addressed, will lead to the deterioration of the DODís HR composition and thereby the inability of the DOD to execute its mission. The strategy is configured ito a metaphorical "cap stand" with "hooks" that should make provision for the development of departmental and Administrative, Operational and Technical (AOT) policies, as well as sub-strategies, to give effect to the macro-direction provided by HR Strategy 2010.
Use is made of, among other sources, documents which have already been approved by the Plenary Defence Staff Council (PDSC) in the recent past, as well as relevant statistics, where appropriate.
CHAPTER 2 Ė REVIEW OF CURRENT HUMAN RESOURCE REALITIES
INTRODUCTION TO THE REVIEW
Ito the Constitution, the main function of the SANDF is the defence of the RSA against any external aggressor. Various secondary functions are also mandated. In reality the RSA faces no external military threat and the SANDF is largely involved with secondary functions, which have, in fact become the primary task. The dichotomy facing defence planners is to what extent limited resources should be directed towards maintaining the capability to execute the primary function versus the necessity to execute secondary functions or ordered commitments. Differing prioritisation viewpoints within the DOD continue to result in efforts to maintain extensive capabilities in both areas, with the resulting decline in output in both areas. The above dichotomy also has a direct bearing on strategic perceptions regarding the DODís "provide HR process", as well as the implementation thereof.
This review comprises an analysis of the primary factors which currently determine, or significantly impact on, the "provide HR process" within the DOD.
DOD MACRO HUMAN RESOURCE PERSPECTIVE
Impact of Force Design Imperatives. The force design proposed in the Defence Review is clearly not affordable, given the budget allocation to Defence. The force levels proposed therein are based on linear projections derived from the budget allocation, rather than from any proposed design. It has therefore been impossible to bring the proposed force design and the budget allocation together in planning considerations, and the DOD has still not been able to finalise a force design and structure after seven years of transformation. The risks pertaining to the non-finalisation of the force design and structure to achieve a relatively steady end-state, have wide-ranging ramifications in the HR environment. Some of the risks pertaining to the HR environment, in particular, are the following:
- The lack of an establishment derived from the force design constrains HR planning. Although much has been achieved wrt designing a more relevant service system, together with some of the support systems to make it work, no specific and detailed assessment of the "as is" profile of the DODís HR can be done in the absence of the "to be" structure. The lack of an establishment is also regarded as contributing towards undue rank inflation within the FTC, resulting in escalating personnel costs. The strategic gaps that may exist, can therefore only be estimated. The execution of many HR management functions such as education, training and development (ETD), acquisition, career and succession planning and separation management is also made more difficult.
- Personnel are experiencing a seemingly interminable transformation process with no clear steady end-state in sight, brought about by continuous uncertainty wrt issues such as security of tenure, threatened base closures, possible retrenchment and the decline in operational capacity. Although the imperatives for change and transformation are recognised, the above factors have a considerable effect on morale, as low-morale is, in itself, a considerable risk for any military force. The attainment of a relatively stable end state is therefore an essential element in the process of rebuilding the morale of the DOD.
Affordability of HR. The White Paper on Defence, Chapter 5, states that "for political, strategic and economic reasons, the SANDF will be an all-volunteer force. It will comprise a relatively small RegF, including a civilian component, which is backed up by a sufficiently large Part Time Force." It is further stated that "a basic structure of this nature is extremely cost effective and allows for flexibility in force levels according to the internal and external security environment." The Defence Review, Chapter 10, par 39.4 states that "a suggested target is that personnel, operating costs and capital renewal could each receive approximately 40%, 30% and 30% representivity of the total appropriation." It is further stated in par 39.5 that "Ö in terms of the present budget allocation and the average personnel cost per individual, a figure of approximately 70 000 is considered a viable Full-Time personnel componentÖ"
The reality is that, since the promulgation of the Defence Review, the DOD has not, and could not, succeed in approaching the suggested 40% target (in real terms) on personnel expenditure. Although the Personnel budget for the year 2001/02 comprises only 39% of the total defence budget, this is a distorted representation as it is compared to a total budget which includes RM5 597 for the strategic defence packages (SDP). When discounting the SDP allocation, the Personnel budget still amounts to 53% of the defence budget, which severely constrains the amount left for the operating budget, thereby seriously impairing defence outputs.
The major reason why personnel expenditure cannot be curtailed is to be found in the SANDFís macro-composition. The SANDF has not given effect to the White Paper and Defence Review provisions that it should comprise a "relatively small RegF, including a civilian component, which is backed up by a sufficiently large Reserve Force (ResF)." Due recognition is given to the fact that it is not feasible to substantially downscale the RegF without suitable personnel redeployment and re-employment enabling mechanisms being in place. Substantial downscaling also entails risks and the ResF is, as a result of prolonged underfunding, currently not in a position to take up the slack resulting from a substantially downscaled RegF. Cognisance must therefore be taken that the Defence Review target of 40% personnel expenditure, if still regarded as an imperative, can only be attained over the long term, once suitable redeployment mechanisms are institutionalised as part of the way that personnel serve in the RegF, and once the ResF has been sufficiently funded to enable it to assume a bigger segment of the defence burden.
One Force Model. The White Paper on Defence, Chapter 5, page 22 and the Defence Review, Chapter 3, par 9.6, page 12, state that the SANDF will consist of a "relatively small" RegF and a "sufficiently largeí" ResF. To date, however, nothing has materialised in planning considerations to give effect to this intention. The chief reason for proclaiming the One Force Model, namely to have a sufficiently large defence capability at a much more affordable cost, has therefore not materialised. Due to the lack of an integrated planning process to synergise the potential contribution of the Reserve Force with that of the Regular Force as well as under-funding of the Reserve Force, leading to a lack of its capacity building in the form of sufficient training and utilisation, the inherent benefits of increased Reserve Force utilisation have not been optimised. Differing viewpoints exist within the DOD as to the role of the ResF, for example whether it is to be an integral part of the SANDFís force design or whether it is to be regarded purely as a wartime reserve. If the latter view prevails, the intentions of the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review cannot be met. All indications are, judging from both the current and proposed force design and structure, that the ResF is not being planned for and a strategic decision in this regard, which should be incorporated in the Military Strategy, is now a matter of urgency. The risk in not taking such a strategic decision is that the FTC personnel budget will continue to consume more than one half of the total Defence budget, with the result that Defence outputs will continue to decline. There is also the additional risk that, should the ResF continue to be starved of resources, its capacity and will to regenerate and be a viable component of the SANDF may be lost.
The notion of the "One Force Model", as spelled out in the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review, has created an opportunity for closer synergy between the RegF and the ResF, which could result in significant savings on personnel and more funds for the DODís operating budget.
The undefined and unquantified state of exactly what is meant by the terms "relatively small" RegF and "sufficiently large" ResF, as well as the undefined extent of integration required between the RegF and ResF ito the "One Force Model", inhibit effective strategic planning.
The prolonged under-funding of both ResF components (Territorial Reserve and Conventional Reserve) endangers the operational efficiency and utility of these components and by implication the operational efficiency of the SANDF as a whole, which may lead to a loss of capacity to regenerate the ResF as a viable component of the SANDF.
The lack of implementation guidelines for the ResFís contribution in support of the force design, as well as uncertainty regarding the ResFís force structure and role, leads to force development (including force preparation and force structuring), prioritisation and resource allocation not making appropriate provision for the ResF.
The imbalance in resource allocation will expedite the deterioration of ResF capabilities at a time when the SANDF relies heavily on the ResF, especially the Territorial Reserves, for internal deployments such as border-line control and cooperation with the SAPS. (It should be noted that the Territorial Reserve, which is in fact the primary driver and actor in the Rural Protection Plan (RPP) owing to the lack of capacity on the part of the SAPS, has as a result of under-funding seen its contribution towards the RPP as well as borderline control decline from over 600 000 man-days in 1997/98 to some 300 000 man-days in 2000/01).
The deterioration in ResF capabilities may lead to a significant reduction in ready and trained personnel to sustain missions and deployments through the provision of relief forces, such as the case may be wrt certain deployments.
The operationalisation / commissioning and maintenance of new platforms resulting from the SDP acquisitions will probably necessitate / require a cheaper outlay on overall personnel expenditure to allocate more funds for the operating budget. In addition, the necessary combat and technical expertise needs to be proactively sourced and retained, not only by concentrating on measures to retain combat and technical expertise in the FTC, but also by concentrating on measures to align the ResF as a complementary supplier of more affordable expertise. The lack of implementation guidelines for the "One Force Model" hampers an integrated HR planning approach, which incorporates maximum utilisation of the ResF, to organise for the new acquisitions.
By not optimising the cost-savings potential of the preparation and utilisation of the ResF, the DOD will continue to spend too much on the RegF, thereby exacerbating an already tenuous position wrt the operating budget.
Given the current macro-composition of the DOD, specifically the SANDF, as well as associated problems wrt downscaling the FTC, the attainment of 40% personnel expenditure is unrealistic and unattainable over the medium term. A more realistic interim objective would be to "peg" personnel expenditure at 45% of the DOD budget.
As a result of the imbalance in prioritisation and resource allocation for the ResF, the DOD forfeits the opportunity to increase the representivity of the ResF through more intensive ResF marketing and recruiting.
The uncertainty regarding the nature, scope and depth of implementation of the "One Force Model" contributes to low-morale amongst RegF and ResF personnel alike.
Principal affirmation is required regarding the extent to which the DODís macro HR composition should be configured and particularly, to what extent the SANDF should pursue the "One Force Model" (especially considering the effect of limited financial resources). The Military Strategy should provide clear guidelines regarding the nature, scope and depth of integration required between the RegF and the ResF.
HUMAN RESOURCE QUANTITY DIMENSION
Since 1994, the size and shape of the DODís HR composition have dominated planning considerations. Ito the White Paper on Defence, Chapter 5, and the Defence Review, Chapter 10, the imperatives of a low conventional threat long-term scenario, the socio-economic upliftment priorities of government and the need to free more funds for the DODís operating purposes, require the DOD to increase the efficiency of its FTC. The DOD is also required to concurrently re-configure its HR composition to constructively reduce the combat-support ratio ("tooth-to-tail") and the RegF to ResF ratio. The optimal FTC constituting of uniformed personnel and Public Service Act personnel (PSAP) ratio, needs to be defined. The re-configuration of the DODís HR composition should also heed the defined guidelines iro representivity pertaining to factors such as race, gender, former force and disability.
Since the commencement of the transformation process, the DOD has substantially reduced its FTC from a peak strength of 101 353 in 1996 to 78 059 as at 15 July 2001, amounting to a reduction of 23%. Personnel reduction has been effected by means of natural attrition (eg resignations, retirements, transfers, selective non-renewal of contracts, discharges and death), the Voluntary Severance Package (VSP) initiative (1996 Ė 01) and the Employer Initiated Package (EIP) initiative (from 2001). Most of the above mechanisms are however voluntary, in that the individual can choose whether and when to separate. Despite available mechanisms such as the potential redeployment of personnel to other State departments and institutions, the DOD is not in a position to substantially expedite personnel reduction through the encouragement, and even less the enforcement, of separations in any significant way. The selective non-renewal of STS contracts only contributes to a partial solution.
The major obstacle preventing a substantial constructive reduction in personnel numbers, is the high national unemployment rate, currently estimated to be in the vicinity of 34%. Personnel who function as breadwinners, who have extended families to support and who do not possess scarce expertise, are most vulnerable wrt separation. A requirement therefor exists for a dedicated and comprehensive redeployment/reskilling/alternative job placement mechanism, to facilitate the empowerment and alternative job placement of personnel who can no longer be utilised.
Uncertainty about a defined and stable force design, force structure and establishment table, has led to a situation where estimates and linear projections driven by the need to reduce personnel expenditure, form the baseline for personnel reduction in particular, as well as HR planning in general. The appropriate and affordable total HR strength of the DOD, including the desired RegF to ResF ratio and the FTC uniformed personnel-PSAP ratio, is not clearly defined. Personnel reduction is therefore not implemented with the aim of reaching a definitive HR strength, because the steady end-state target strength is as yet uncertain. The Defence Review, Chapter 10, par 39.5, states that "Öa figure of approximately 70 000 is considered a viable Full-Time personnel componentÖ". Since the compilation of the Defence Review, various imperatives such as the SDP acquisitions, general improvements in salary conditions and the effect of new allowances, have however intervened. The appropriateness and affordability of a 70 000 strong FTC is therefore currently debatable and remains to be re-determined.
The DODís HR quantity dimension is still high on the corporate agenda and will remain so, but this will be a hollow debate if the quality dimension is not addressed. As most DOD personnel are aware of these requirements, morale and the retention of expertise are influenced by feelings of insecurity on the one hand and frustrations as a result of slow progress on the other hand.
A clearly defined and stable force design, force structure and establishment table are prerequisites for defining the appropriate and affordable size and shape of the DODís HR composition.
As a result of the fluidity in strategic planning, personnel reduction is not guided by a clearly defined establishment, but primarily by the urgent need to reduce personnel expenditure to liberate more funds for operating purposes so that the SANDF can execute its assigned mission.
The lack of an enforceable Exit Management Framework will continue to hamper efforts to expedite downsizing and rightsizing.
In the absence of appropriate separation enablers, such as an effective redeployment mechanism to grant personnel a high probability of finding alternative employment in civilian society, the DOD can expect significant resistance to any large scale downsizing exercise.
Lack of visibility regarding the steady end-state force design, force structure and establishment table may lead to a situation where personnel reduction continues apace, without due consideration of the adequate and appropriate number of personnel which may be required by the steady end-state force design. Base and unit closures which are not aligned with a definitive force design, force structure and establishment table, but implemented as part of cost-saving measures, may be regarded as a symptom of the lack of visibility regarding the steady end-state force design, force structure and establishment table
A seemingly interminable transformation process characterised by uncertainty regarding personnel reduction targets and the timeframe to attain a steady end-state strength, contribute significantly to low-morale.
Uncertainty regarding the steady end-state strength ito various ratios, particularly the RegF-ResF ratio, combat-support ratio and representivity ratios, not only impedes effective HR planning but also contributes significantly to low-morale.
The DOD needs a stable force design, force structure and establishment, which should serve to place the primary focus of personnel reduction and re-configuration processes on force requirements.
Personnel reduction and re-configuration will be required to configure the HR composition ito affordable force requirements and appropriate ratios. The DOD therefore needs appropriate mobility mechanisms to facilitate the successful redeployment of larger numbers of personnel into civilian society, with a particular emphasis on the finding of suitable alternative employment for such personnel. The will and support of all relevant stakeholders are required to ensure an affordable re-configuration of the DODís HR composition.
HUMAN RESOURCE QUALITY DIMENSION
The HR quality dimension of a defence force is the product of various factors. Although there are unique influencing factors pertaining to individual defence forces, generic factors such as morale, the way that personnel serve (ie the cost-benefit dividend of service systems for the organisation and individuals), the level of personnelís education and training, their capacity to exploit the advantages of appropriate modern technology, exposure to operations, age, physiological, psychological and sociological health and wellbeing can all be regarded as primary drivers that determine the quality of a defence forceís HR profile. This analysis addresses those salient factors which currently impact negatively on the quality dimension of the DODís HR composition. (Note that morale is not addressed per se, as this factor has already been extensively dealt with in the strategy on low-morale and the loss of expertise).
SERVICE SYSTEM RATIOS
The regular component of most modern volunteer defence forces, including the SANDF, relies on an employment approach comprising different service systems / components. These service systems, in general, make provision for
- a large component of young and fit personnel to supply the bulk of operational/deployment requirements, characterised by rapid turnover of personnel to ensure constant rejuvenation;
- a smaller core component of professional military personnel to render essential management, training and administrative functions; and
- a very small component comprising top leadership and management.
The intention of the FSS, implemented since 1994, was to lend greater flexibility and affordability to the SANDFís response to various threats. Instead of having to maintain a large and costly Permanent Force, it was approved that the SANDF should be able to rapidly adjust its HR strength according to the threat forecast. The STS should consist of the bulk of the SANDFís young and fit personnel, primarily with a view to potential deployment. This service system should therefore be characterised by constant rapid turnover which would ensure the rejuvenation of the bulk of deployable personnel as well as a much more affordable option to ensure bulk "feet on the ground". The MTS should accommodate middle-ranking personnel who are identified for medium term careers. The intention of the LTS was that it should downscale and eventually contain a smaller number of personnel who would form the essential command and management cadre of the SANDF. The peacetime FSS ratio was estimated to be STS: 40%, MTS: 40% and LTS: 20%.
Varied interpretation and implementation of the FSS has, however, led to thousands of STS personnel being translated to the MTS and LTS. As a result, the current FSS ratio is 13% STS : 39% MTS : 48% LTS. The cost implications of 87% of RegF personnel serving medium to extended long-term tenures are apparent. Perceptions of excessive rank inflation are also associated with the application of this system, where the bulk of personnel are not subject to rapid throughput and rejuvenation provisions. Whilst due recognition is given to integration imperatives that led to the extraordinary translation of most former Non-Statutory Force personnel to the MTS and LTS, the expansion of this measure to also include many former SADF and SANDF personnel is a major contributory cause of the skewed rank/mustering vs age pyramids in many of the combat corps. This factor impacts negatively on the SANDFís deployment potential.
Instead of leading to maximum flexibility and personnel expenditure savings, both the STS and MTS have, in general, merely become parts of a continuum that presents a perceived life-long career prospect to RegF personnel. The principle of rapid turnover to ensure a bulk of young and fit personnel for deployment has, more prominently in the case of the SA Army, not materialised.
The way that the FSS has been implemented until now has precluded the SANDF from the effective management of low-morale causal factors such as stagnation in rank, exceeding the optimal age-rank vs mustering criteria, consistent low performance and serious disciplinary problems. The general manifestation, causes and complexity of disciplinary problems fall outside the scope of this strategy and would require an in-depth study of the like of the Ministerial Inquiry on Transformation in the DOD (Setai Committee) to add substantive value to any disciplinary analysis. Suffice it to state that the way that the FSS has been implemented, has created numerous frustrations amongst members such as stagnation and unrealistic expectations of life-long employment in the SANDF, whether members continued to comply with their utilisation criteria or not, that have contributed to disciplinary problems. The FSS has therefore not served to provide the SANDF with an optimal return on investment employment structure.
The absence of suitable complementary systems and processes ("enablers") as part of the total service system "package" to make military service (especially service in highly specialised musterings) attractive and beneficial for the individual, have also contributed to the failure of the FSS to attract and retain scarce expertise. More recent retention initiatives, such as the implementation of a production bonus system for naval combat officers, only address one specific high expertise mustering. The ideal would have been for the FSS to embody a range of enabling mechanisms to retain scarce expertise across the board.
The way that the FSS is implemented detracts from the employment ethos and practice found in most contemporary volunteer defence forces, namely that the majority of SANDF RegF personnel do expect a life-long career in the RegF. This ethos is also consonant with contemporary civilian labour practice, namely that working people have to undergo life-long learning and continuous reskilling to enable them to migrate through a number of career changes, while adding value (bmo enhanced competency) to each successive career. Several career changes are the norm in the top performing economies of both the developed and the developing world. The majority of the regular personnel in such defence forces do in fact utilise their stint of military service as a launch pad to acquire valuable skills and experience, which they then profitably apply in civilian society. The defence force, in turn, is then also assured of a higher skilled national population base to call upon in cases of national emergency, or to fulfil other surge demands for military personnel, in fact creating a win-win situation which benefits the national economy, the defence force and the individual.
Although many defence forces world-wide successfully utilise term-service systems to regulate their HR requirements, most have complementary systems and processes ("enablers") in place which make the system work. Aspects such as vocational ETD as part of the term contract, which enable such personnel to re-integrate into civilian society as productive citizens, are given a high priority and focus. The structure of the relevant pension schemes also allows personnel to move out of the force at specific points of tenure with no loss of benefits or, alternatively, a sustainable pension. Unfortunately, no such "enablers" are as yet in place to support the FSS in the SANDF.
The FSS has largely failed to accomplish its aim, ie to grant optimal flexibility wrt force levels and affordability wrt personnel expenditure in the SANDF.
By not applying the FSS according to the prescribed implementation measures, the SANDF forfeited the opportunity to realise substantial savings on personnel expenditure, which could rather have been dedicated to the operating budget and increased defence outputs.
The way that the FSS is applied has significantly contributed to the deterioration of the (operational) quality of the SANDFís HR composition, as reflected in the age-rank vs mustering pyramids of particularly junior-level combat personnel.
The way that the FSS is applied does not create the required capacity for the constant rapid throughput of young and fit personnel, thereby contributing significantly to financial constraints and the inability to feed the ResF.
The absence of appropriate redeployment enabling mechanisms in the FSS deters personnel, especially those with less initiative and drive, from considering alternative employment and leads to stagnation, a general lowering of standards and low-morale.
Instead of contributing towards the constant rejuvenation of the SANDFís deployable personnel, the way that the FSS is applied hampers the deployment potential of the SANDF Ė the current system simply cannot effectively deal with / re-deploy personnel who can no longer be operationally utilised.
The way that the FSS is applied has led to unrealistic expectations that the SANDF should provide all its personnel with a life-long job, instead of being a first career stage after completing school. Insufficient communication on the nature and intent of the FSS have no doubt largely contributed to this state of affairs.
Given a limited budget, demanding operating requirements and increasing external deployment expectations, the principles of affordability and flexibility in force levels will continue to be pursued by the SANDF. The SANDF therefore requires a new service system, which is based upon accruing optimal cost-benefit advantages for the organisation.
Optimal cost-benefit advantages can only be realised if the SANDF pursues a rapid throughput approach wrt the bulk of its RegF personnel and implements enabling mechanisms that will make the retention of scarce expertise, as well as retraining and redeployment after a specified term of service, an attractive option for all personnel. This will also ensure the required feeding of the ResF.
The nature of the world of work and current employment practices, particularly the interrelationship between employment in the military and in civilian society, should be communicated to all SANDF personnel, even before they are employed. There should be no misunderstanding among prospective SANDF applicants that, although the SANDF can provide exciting and rewarding careers, life-long employment cannot be provided to all its personnel. The value-added benefits of service in the SANDF should also be articulated, especially in preparing personnel for possible future careers in civilian society.
Within the RegF, 52% of Privates (Pte) (10 151) (where the rank of Pte is applicable, read also the equivalent ranks of Amn (SAAF) and Smn (SAN)) are between 30 and 60 years old, while approximately 50% of junior non commissioned officer (NCOís) (Lance Corporal (L Cpl)) to (Corporal (Cpl)) (8 710)(Where the rank of L Cpl and Cpl is applicable read also the equivalent rank of AB and L smn), are between 30 and 60 years old. These age parameters by far exceed the optimal international rank-age norm for the stated ranks. The effect of the age imbalance is that Services, particularly the SA Army, carry significant numbers of combat personnel whose effective deployment potential is restricted as a result of their age. Most deployments, especially potential external deployments of extended duration (such as may be required for certain peace missions), require a bulk of young, fit and healthy soldiers who are not area bound and who are also unencumbered with extensive family commitments, ie being unmarried. The SA Military Health Serviceís (SAMHSís) Project RESILIENCE found that older personnel are generally more area bound, are loath to leave their properties unattended, are married and have family responsibilities, while they are generally less amenable to hard physical training. Older personnel generally have young families to support, with spouses being put in a difficult position to sustain the family while the members are away for extended periods. The positive factors of generally greater stability and maturity coupled with increasing age are however, offset by the negatives discussed above. The cumulative effect of the above factors, coupled with the number of personnel who exceed the required rank-age ratio, inhibit the SANDFís deployment potential.
Where age-rank parameters do not discernibly differ among the various junior ranks, command and control, as well as disciplinary problems, may result. In the case of the SA Army for example, the bulk of Pteís and junior leaders are approximately of the same age, with the average age of Cplís, L Cplís and Pteís being 33, 32 and 31 years respectively. In many instances the age of Pteís by far exceeds that of their junior leaders. A discrepancy of this extent inevitably leads to a loss in efficiency and tension in the ranks.
The ageing of the force is predominantly a concern wrt the SANDFís combat musterings and the effect thereof on deployment potential. It should be noted however, that the ageing of the force is also abetted by the absence of a tenure policy for middle and senior ranks that specifies the maximum term that should be served in the various ranks at these levels and which makes provision for exit and/or redeployment options. At middle and senior levels, the effects of stagnation can be as detrimental to morale, efficiency and productivity as the effects of age discrepancy at junior levels.
It should be noted that age-rank considerations also apply to the ResF. If the One Force Model is to be given effect, it is required that the ResF, like the RegF, has a feeder source comprising young, fit and healthy personnel. The leader group of the ResF, specifically, needs urgent rejuvenation and essential rectification iro its representivity.
The steadily increasing age of the bulk of the SANDFís deployable personnel can be expected to hamper force preparation, force employment and force sustainment.
The steadily increasing age of the bulk of the SANDFís deployable personnel will lead to increasing health care, housing and resettlement costs for the DOD.
The ageing of the force can mainly be attributed to the absence of a suitable service system with embedded enabling mechanisms which facilitate the retraining and redeployment of personnel who no longer comply with the age requirements for their musterings, as well as the absence of a maximum tenure in rank policy for middle and senior ranks to prevent stagnation.
One of the determining factors of a defence forceís operational effectiveness is that the bulk of its deployable personnel should be young, fit and healthy.
The SANDF cannot afford to reach a situation where its deployment potential is impaired as a result of the continuous increase in age of the bulk of its deployable personnel.
Enabling mechanisms are required to effectively re-deploy personnel whose age exceeds the acceptable rank-age vs mustering parameters and to ensure that adherence to these parameters are maintained, thereby preventing the recurrence of a similar situation wrt age incompatibility in which the SANDF currently finds itself.
A "tenure in rank" policy is required to prevent stagnation at middle and senior levels.
In 1999, the health status of SANDF personnel was registered as a strategic issue. The Exercise BLUE CRANE health assessments, as well as subsequent CHA, indicate that health non-compliance will increasingly negatively impact on the SANDFís deployment capability and, more specifically, its external deployment capability (especially the sustaining of peace missions). There is particular concern regarding the effect of disease, most prominently HIV/AIDS, on the external deployment capability of the SANDF, as well as the effect on cost escalation to maintain personnel who cannot be utilised. The most immediate health status challenges, from an HR perspective, include the continuous comprehensive quantification of disease prevalence within the SANDF; policy to manage the effect of HIV/AIDS; pro-active HR planning (in the widest sense and by all stakeholders) to ensure the continued availability of the required numbers of fit and trained personnel, as well as measures pertaining to the redeployment, reskilling and alternative employment of personnel who, as a result of their health status, can no longer be utilised within the SANDF.
The deterioration of the DODís personnel health status, primarily as a result of HIV/AIDS, constitutes the biggest single threat to the deployment potential and operational effectiveness of the SANDF, even over the long term or until such time as an HIV antidote/vaccine is found.
As HIV prevalence is more prominent among the age group between 25 to 29 years old (ie the age bracket that should provide the largest number of deployable personnel), the SANDF requires a constant rapid throughput of young, fit and healthy personnel to compensate for HR requirements resulting from the deteriorating health status of currently serving personnel.
Health status impacts on all HR sub-processes, ie personnel acquisition, staffing, ETD, career development, utilisation, maintenance and separation. Policy is required to address the management of personnel within the context of their health status, wrt each of the above HR sub-process areas.
A continuous influx and rapid turnover of young, fit and healthy personnel is required to guarantee the SANDFís deployment capacity, given the effects of health status.
PRE-EMPLOYMENT EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The DOD is dependent on the quality of the supply-side from the open labour market. The reality of the South African situation is that the DOD is inundated with young people desperately seeking employment (with an official unemployment rate estimated to be 34%). Most of these job seekers, unfortunately, do not have subjects (specifically mathematics and science) which are in demand by the SANDF to meet its most critical combat, technical and professional HR requirements. The DOD must furthermore compete against a multitude of other employers who are also dependent on the limited annual turnout of top performers who meet the profile for employment in highly specialised occupations. It is expected that the capacity of the educational system to produce more technology-orientated school leavers at a sustained rate, will take some time.
The continuous attrition of highly trained and experienced personnel (owing to labour market pull-factors, low-morale and perceptions of career limitations) will complicate the operationalisation of the new platforms and systems resulting from the SDP acquisitions. This consideration, together with the requirements to normalise the representivity ratio in the SANDFís highly specialised musterings, as well as in the DODís highly specialised occupational classes (eg finance officials) and the need to minimise the DODís/SANDFís investment risk wrt expensive specialised training, will increase the necessity for the DOD to facilitate the continuous pre-employment ETD of a select number of school leavers to bring them up to par with the required educational standards for appointment in such musterings / occupational classes.
The above factors, as well as the investment risk inherent in the current employment-while-studying cost-benefit structure of certain musterings, may merit re-considering the extension of pre-employment ETD to cover certain categories of advanced and intermediate ETD. The payment of salaries and full benefits while personnel are studying full-time, fall-out rates while studying, re-mustering and retraining problems, as well as the retention rate upon obtaining of qualifications, do not provide an optimal return on investment. The outsourcing of certain categories of advanced training (eg student engineers) and intermediate training (eg apprentice training, which is not Service-unique), will amount to a cheaper option (the SANDF will not have to pay salaries and full benefits), higher quality (with final selection and SANDF employment occurring only after successful completion of studies) and, therefore, a lower investment risk.
In order to contribute towards solving the scarce expertise problem and the leader group problem within the ResF, pre-employment ETD opportunities in the form of a ROTC-type scheme should be considered to lure school leavers with a high development potential to join the ResF. The aim should be to offer tertiary training (which can lead to the award of Certificates, Diplomas and Degrees presented at the Military Academy) for young ResF officers who are appointed in combat and technical specialisations. In return for the study opportunity, such officers will have a contractual commitment to serve in the ResF for a specified period. This will ensure that the pool of scarce expertise in the RegF can be complemented with a more affordable source of scarce expertise.
There is a mismatch between the quality of education of most school leavers who seek DOD employment and the educational qualifications required by the DOD, particularly the SANDF, as a predominantly technology-based employer. The necessity of bridging the gap will gain prominence as the SANDF continues to modernise its capital equipment holdings.
An upswing in the economy can be expected to lead to even more highly trained and experienced personnel leaving the DOD for employment in the private sector, while top- performing school leavers, may in the majority of cases, not select the DOD/SANDF as an employer of first choice. This will reinforce the necessity for the DOD to facilitate the continuous pre-employment ETD of a select number of school leavers to bring them up to par with the required educational standards for appointment in the DODís/SANDFís highly specialised occupational classes/musterings. Specific investment in this regard should be considered as money well spent as a contribution towards the RDP.
The current employment-while-studying structure for school leavers, such as engineering students and certain apprentice trades, do not provide an optimal return on investment for the DOD.
By instituting a ROTC-type tertiary training scheme for the ResF, the DOD will be able to complement its diminished pool of scarce expertise in the RegF with an affordable source, at the same time also reinforcing the ResFís leader group element.
High volatility in the labour market, leading to a continuous outflow of expertise, and the problems experienced in attracting sufficient candidates with good mathematics and science marks will necessitate the pre-employment ETD of a select number of potential DOD/SANDF candidates as a medium to long-term feature.
The high investment risk potential of employing school leavers while they are studying full-time can be solved through the extension of pre-employment ETD to cover certain categories of advanced and intermediate training and by extending pre-employment ETD to include combat and technical officers in the ResF.
EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT FOR POST-EMPLOYMENT AND CIVILIAN SOCIETY REINTEGRATION
Affordable and flexible force levels can only be attained if there is an appropriate mechanism to facilitate the continuous throughput of personnel. The high unemployment rate deters serving personnel, particularly those who do not meet the high technology skills requirements currently in demand by the private sector, from leaving the employment of the DOD. The result is that many personnel who no longer meet the criteria for the posts in which they serve (especially wrt rank/age incompatibility or fitness), or who have little career advancement prospects (for whatever reason), have little option but to hang on to their current jobs and, in many cases experience stagnation and low-morale. The dilemma that this situation creates for the organisation, especially from an operational deployment and productivity point of view, is apparent. Currently there is no system in place that links tenure of service to an appropriate retraining and alternative job placement programme. Employment contracts, moreover, do not make provision for the exercising of such an option.
The only feasible way to ensure sustained and effective post-employment ETD and reintegration of personnel into civilian society is through the establishment of a one-stop service Redeployment Agency that makes provision for both the appropriate reskilling of personnel and their placement into alternative employment/occupations. The nature and scope of activities to be undertaken by such an agency will call for donor funding as well as an integrated public-private partnership programme.
In view of current socio-economic realities, especially high levels of unemployment, it is imperative that redeployment should occur in a seamless way. Individual members who have completed their term of service or who can no longer be effectively utilised, should be assessed ito their aptitude and civilian career preferences and aspirations; educated, trained and developed to specification for an alternative career and placed in alternative employment as part of an uninterrupted process of transition from military to civilian life. Such transition should furthermore occur within the context of an Exit Management Framework that is appropriately incentivised to grant appropriate recognition for service rendered in the DOD.
An integrated redeployment-retraining-alternative job placement system, which makes provision for all serving personnel irrespective of their service contract, is required to facilitate equitable separation, counter low-morale, address age-rank vs mustering discrepancies, prevent stagnation and improve efficiency in general.
In order to attain an affordable and effective HR composition, the SANDF requires an integrated one-stop service redeployment-retraining-alternative job placement system which accommodates the requirements of personnel whose term of service expires or who can no longer be effectively utilised.
The redeployment-retraining-alternative job placement system, should be facilitated and supported by an appropriate Exit Management Framework which is appropriately incentivised in order to encourage members whose term of service expires or who can no longer be effectively utilised, to be equipped for an alternative career in civilian society.
Since 1994 the DOD has made significant progress in improving representivity, especially ito race and gender. Recruitment, appointments, promotions and career development are executed in compliance with the relevant regulatory criteria for representivity. Three particular areas are apparent however, where the normalisation of representivity has not yet occurred.
- Specialised Musterings. The objective of attaining the representivity level reflected in the Defence Review (64,6% African; 24,3% White; 10,2% Coloured and 0,75% Indian) has not yet been attained in the SANDFís highly specialised musterings. Although valiant efforts are being made by marketing and recruiting staff, the representivity of Blacks persons in highly specialised musterings such as pilots, navigators, naval combat officers, engineers and health professionals is still low. The legacy of the former school dispensation, which did not place a primary emphasis on the study of mathematics and science, nor the encouragement of careers in technological environments, is to blame for this. African persons were furthermore only allowed to join the former SADFís Permanent Force wef 1990. As the re-orientation of learning towards a more technological focus will probably only start to deliver significant results over the long term, the DOD is therefore moved to become innovative and find ways to increase representivity in the above musterings over the short to medium term. The implementation of the DOD Youth Foundation Training Program (YFTP) wef April 2001 represents a move in this direction.
- Middle Management. The DODís middle management is predominantly White and male. Ito a working definition of "middle management" that includes the rank levels of Major (Maj) (where the rank of Maj is applicable, read the equivalent rank of Lt Cmdr (SAN)) to Colonel (Col) (where the rank of Col is applicable, read also the equivalent rank of Capt (SAN)) and Sergeant (Sgt) (where the rank of Sgt is applicable read also the equivalent rank of PO (PO)) Warrant Officer Class 1 (WO1), 53,6% of the combined total in the above ranks is White. The RegF middle management comprises 82,6% men and 17,4% women. Due cognisance should be taken however, that improving racial representivity will prove to be much easier than improving the apparent gender imbalance within the uniformed component. Generally, young women do not wish to become soldiers (in peace-time milieus) and uniformed personnel have to "grow" through the ranks to attain credibility and effectiveness as "middle managers". The PSAP middle management grouping which includes the levels of Official to Deputy Director, is 75% White. Women comprise 67,3% of the PSAP middle management. This high ratio is the result of the historical legacy whereby women were mostly appointed in the former SADF as civilian workers. Despite the exodus of thousands of Whites from the DOD since the early 1990s, there are probably many reasons why the above situation still exists, not least of which is the requirement to retain a critical pool of scarce specialist skills and experience. The strategic issue of low-morale and the loss of expertise brought to the fore that the established skills base has already hit rock bottom in several specialist musterings. The fact remains however, that this situation cannot remain anomalous and that all resources that can be mustered must be optimally employed to normalise the current imbalance as soon as is realistically attainable.
- Entry Level. Contrasted against a predominantly White middle management, the SANDF experiences an anomaly at the other end of the employment scale, namely a preponderantly Black, and especially African, composition amongst the rank groups Pte to Cpl. In the SANDF these groups comprise 97,4% Blacks (91,7% Africans) and 2,6% Whites; L Cpl rank comprise 92% Blacks (80,5% Africans) and 8% Whites and Cplís rank comprise 84,7% Blacks (68,2% Africans) and 15,3% Whites. When the composition of the SA Army in particular is reviewed, the representivity discrepancy displays an even bigger magnitude. Once again there are probably several reasons why the above situation developed. An anomaly of this extent cannot, however, remain un-addressed. Resources will therefore also have to be employed to attract more young White persons, as well as more Indians and Coloureds, to normalise the composition at the lower levels.
Ito total personnel numbers, the DOD has generally attained an optimal level of representivity.
The focus over the short to medium term should shift towards normalising the state of representivity in the SANDFís professional and highly specialised combat and technical musterings, at middle-management level and at the entry level.
All existing measures should be activated and robustly implemented to enhance the attainment of broad representivity at all levels and in all musterings and post classes within the DOD in order to reach the guideline targets as stated in the Defence Review. Innovative ways should also be explored to assist with this process.
All "provide HR" processes should grant priority one attention towards normalising the representivity ratios within the SANDFís highly specialised and professional musterings; at middle management level and at entry level. Established processes to affirm Designated Persons, such as focused advertising campaigns for recruitment purposes, mentoring, coaching and fast tracking should be exploited. Other innovative measures such as "talent scouting"/"head hunting" throughout the public and private sectors should also be optimised.
UNIFORM / PSAP DIVIDE
The 17 000 odd PSAP constitute 21,7% of the total FTC. PSAP serve integrated with uniformed personnel in all Services and Divisions, in most occupational classes and at most levels. Due recognition is given to the fact that two different regulatory frameworks govern uniformed personnel and PSAP respectively. The reality however, as was found during the investigation into the strategic issue on low-morale, is that there is a perceptional "divide" between these two components ito management, career opportunities, career development and general treatment, giving effect to perceptions of discrimination against the PSAP component. The two different regulatory frameworks lead to differentiated managerial and administrative approaches and practices which are not conducive to a unified HR managerial ethos and management practices in the DOD.
The SANDF is and should by the nature of its mission, be a military (and predominantly uniformed-orientated) organisation. The nature of modern military operations, however, is such that civilian personnel are becoming more involved in deployments, including functioning in the theatre of operations, eg maintaining sophisticated weapons systems. This factor, as well as the high proportional PSAP representation in the DOD, necessitates close synergy and mutual understanding between the uniformed and civilian components. It ideally also calls for an integrated and preferably undifferentiating management and administrative system for all DOD and SANDF personnel.
The SA Police Service (SAPS) succeeded in amending the Police Act to include both its uniformed and civilian components under the provisions of the Act. The advantages and disadvantages of following a similar route wrt the DOD should be investigated.
Although it is not the intention that HR Strategy 2010 should address in detail any HR sub-process (functional) strategies (many of which will have to be developed and revised as a result of HR Strategy 2010), the macro "developmental-orientated" slant of the strategy would be amiss without addressing the position of those PSAP who occupy the lowest rungs (levels 1 Ė 3) on the employment scale. The DOD employs 10 643 PSAP on levels 1 to 3 who function as hygiene workers (cleaners), groundsmen (terrain workers and gardeners), food services aids (kitchen staff), messengers, etc. Dedicated and focused programmes to uplift the majority, if not all, of this category of employees ito appropriate ETD opportunities and programmes would serve to partially address historical inequities, improve morale and contribute to the vision that the total DOD should become a learning organisation. The practical benefits that such upliftment would entail for participating individuals and their dependants, as well as the organisation, would be substantial.
Factors which give rise to perceptional or real discrimination within the HR management and administrative ambit of a defence force are not conducive to cohesion and esprit deí corps. All the constituent HR components of the DOD should ideally experience substantive and procedural uniformity in managerial and administrative practices.
The focused upliftment of the lowest levels of PSAP through appropriate ETD opportunities and programmes will enhance efficiency, productivity and employee satisfaction in the DOD.
The feasibility of significant alignment of the differentiating regulatory frameworks governing uniformed personnel and PSAP respectively, as well as non-differentiating HR management practices and administrative measures for uniformed personnel and PSAP should be investigated.
Appropriate ETD opportunities and programmes with a dedicated focus to uplift PSAP employed on levels 1 to 3, should be implemented.
HUMAN RESOURCE SUPPORT
It is the "business" and raison dí être of the "provide HR process" to ensure that
- the quality and quantity of personnel as required by the Military Strategy and force design, are maintained;
- personnel are competent to execute and support the Military Strategy ; and
- personnel are managed in accordance with modern best practices.
Transformation, restructuring and concomitant uncertainties, the apparent prolonged staffing process, the advent of military unionisation and new responsibilities, delegations and lines of command resulting therefrom have, among other factors, contributed to the HR process being experienced negatively by many DOD personnel.
The absence of a single-point of responsibility for the total spectrum of HR management (as is vested in the HR Directors of most major corporate organisations), as well as the apparent "fragmentation" of the DODís HR management process, also contributes to the HR process being experienced negatively by many DOD personnel.
A reduction in expertise, a lack of experience and perceptions of inefficient client-service are also contributory factors. The nature and quality of HR service not only reflect on the commitment and professionalism of HR functionaries, but also convey a picture of service rendering by the total DOD. Should personnel have a negative experience wrt HR service rendering, they will tend to blame the corporate DOD. HR service rendering therefore represents an image of the total DOD.
All the factors necessary to ensure efficient HR service delivery can, however, be addressed within the "provide HR" process itself, thereby contributing to the desired end result.
From a strategic perspective, the following areas can be regarded as the "pillars" on which the effective execution of the HR process stands:
- Management Competency. The general level of HR management competency (ie knowledge, skills and attitude) exhibited by commanders and managers, as well as the specialist competency exhibited by HR functionaries, plays an important role in determining the effectiveness and efficiency of HR service delivery. It should be questioned whether the DODís current HR management competencies are sufficient to cope with the stringent demands posed by current and future HR management. Of particular concern is a general perception of the absence of a practiced ethos and commitment to effective and efficient service delivery. With specific regard to HR functionaries, it could be argued that the current transformation mode requires of them to be
- strategic partners who should align the HR system with the DODís mission and the requirements of the Military Strategy;
- administrative experts who set up an efficient HR system design and system delivery; and
- employee champions who ensure that personnelís contributions, including their commitment and competence, remain high.
- Sound Labour Relations. All organisations depend on labour to attain their outputs and HR are rightfully regarded as organisationsí most important asset. Furthermore an organisationsí output depends on the degree of labour peace within the organisation. Good faith participation in labour relations by both the employer and trade unions, is a prerequisite for labour peace and entails sincere efforts by both parties to resolve differences through participative structures. Chapter XX of the amended General Regulations for the SANDF and Reserve, provides for fair labour practices, the establishment of military trade unions, collective bargaining on certain issues of mutual interest, the non-disruption of military operations, exercises and training as a result of trade union activities, and an environment conducive to sound and healthy service relations. As unionisation of the uniformed component is a relatively new phenomenon in the SANDF, the biggest challenges seem to be the alignment of command and managerial attitudes at all levels to manage this reality within the context of sound and healthy service relations, rather than from a confrontational or apathetic approach, as well as the continuous education and training of all DOD personnel regarding sound labour relations.
- The Provisioning of HR Policies. Commanders and managers depend on visible HR direction, embodied in comprehensive and up-to-date policy which is effectively communicated to and understood at, all levels. The constantly changing regulatory framework environment of the HR domain necessitates that the relevance and comprehensiveness of HR policy be constantly revisited at the HR policy formulation level; that policy be promulgated in a user-friendly manner and that it be effectively communicated and executed within the DOD.
- The Provisioning of Client Orientated HR Practices. The effectiveness of HR policies depends on the effectiveness ito which they are executed. During the investigation into the strategic issue on low-morale, the requirement was identified for the DOD to have HR practices which focus on prompt service delivery and client-satisfaction, which eliminate red tape; which are user-friendly; which empower personnel to be responsible for their personal HR administration and which are based on best practice and supported by professional research and development.
- IT Support. The efficient management and administration of the DODís HR depend on relevant state-of-the-art integrated IT systems which are professionally managed and operated. As was articulated in the analysis of the strategy on low-morale, the current DOD personnel and salary system is inadequate to cope with the demands of providing a fully-integrated and user-friendly HR management and planning tool, while usage of the system is characterised by inefficiency and re-work. The requirements for an integrated user-friendly HR management IT system, as well as the professionalism of operators and users, are apparent.
- Channels of Command and Lodging of Grievances. Effective communication, including transparency and feedback, is a key success factor for successful HR management. In the domain of queries, complaints and grievances, the DOD has no efficient and standardised mechanism through which to monitor the lodging of submissions and the tracking of progress to address complaints. This contributes to frustration and low-morale. There is thus a requirement for a central IT database to monitor the status of ministerial enquiries, questions in parliament, queries, complaints and grievances and to facilitate prompt progress feedback to personnel concerned.
HR are the DODís most important asset. The absence of a single-point HR management responsibility to co-ordinate and orchestrate the management of this asset, especially given the requirements of concluding the "unfinished business" of (HR) transformation, therefore seems to be an anomaly.
Labour peace is essential for defence outputs. Sound labour practices should therefore form an integral part of commandersí and managersí daily actions.
All DOD/SANDF personnel should be aware of their rights and responsibilities ito sound labour relations.
HR functionaries apparently do not sufficiently realise that the quality and efficiency of their outputs reflect on the image of the corporate DOD.
As all the factors necessary to ensure efficient HR service delivery can be addressed within the "provide HR process" itself, the factors which inhibit the capacity to do so need to be monitored constantly and redressed through policy reworking and consistent practice according to the policy.
It should be questioned to what extent the DODís HR management competencies comply with the special demands of transformation and, especially, with the demands for client orientation and service delivery.
The DOD requires comprehensive, up to date, easily understood, expertly communicated and easily accessible policies which cover all the "provide HR" sub-process domains.
The DOD requires client-focused HR practices which eliminate red tape, which are user-friendly, which empower personnel to be responsible for their personal HR administration, and which are based on best practice and supported by professional research and development.
The efficiency of the existing DOD personnel and salary system and the proficiency of its operators and users need to be revisited in the quest for better service delivery and efficient HR management.
The quality and effectiveness of complaints and grievances management can be enhanced at all levels of command through the establishment of a central IT database to monitor the status of ministerial enquires, questions in parliament, queries, complaints and grievances and to facilitate prompt progress feedback to personnel concerned. Such a mechanism will also contribute towards client satisfaction and higher morale.
The DODís "provide HR" process should be based on modern best practices, at the outset of personnel acquisition to separation.
The structural capacity of the "provide HR" needs to be enhanced through the elimination of fragmentation and through the continuous improvement of coordination amongst HR sub-processes.
Service delivery needs to be enhanced, particularly by improving the HR process systems and process capacity, as well as the client-focussed attitude of HR functionaries.
There should be a centre of labour relations excellence within the DOD to provide specialists for negotiation and specialist labour-relations support and training. It can be expected that the unionisation of SANDF members in particular will increase, and this will require such a centre of excellence to provide the appropriate support to commanders and managers, as well.
The appropriateness and standard of the DODís HR management competencies need to be revisited.
Effective HR policy which governs all the "provide HR" sub-process domains, should be continuously updated according to changing needs.
The imperatives of a standard user-friendly IT HR management tool and the training of users and operators requires urgent attention.
The effectiveness of command communication needs to be enhanced through a central standardised IT database that records and tracks the progress of all queries, complaints and grievances. This should expedite the processing of queries, complaints and grievances, thereby reducing membersí frustration resulting from undue lead-times and contributing towards better client service.
CHAPTER 3 Ė HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGY 2010
HR STRATEGY STATEMENT
Cognisance should be taken that the "HR management domain", in its broadest sense, interacts and is closely aligned with every facet of management, from organisational structure design and the legal and disciplinary domains to health matters and communication. It is therefore impossible to cover all HR-related issues in this strategy. Managerial matters which are already being addressed in other DOD processes, such as crime (being addressed in terms of the DODís Strategy on Criminality), health status (being managed in terms of the DOD Instruction on the Management of SANDF Members within the Context of their Health Status), Full Range Leadership Development (being addressed as part of the DOD Leadership, Command and Management Principles [LCAMPS] Programme) and morale (being addressed in terms of the Strategy on Low Morale and the Loss of Expertise), may therefore be alluded to, but are not reiterated in this strategy.
HR Strategy 2010 presents a macro HR strategic direction to the DOD, to be followed over the period 2001 to 2010. This strategy addresses the high-level HR management alignment of the DOD in order to enable the effective and efficient execution of the DODís mission. HR Strategy 2010 should therefore serve as a guideline for the development and/or amendment of AOT policy and strategies to address the generic HR sub-processes of personnel provisioning, ETD, career development, utilisation, maintenance and separation, and to inform the development of other DOD/SANDF strategies.
Linkage Between the SANDF Military Strategy and the DOD HR Strategy 2010. As a result of the urgent need to provide HR strategic direction to the DOD/SANDF, the DOD HR Strategy 2010 was developed as a Support Strategy. Perceptions may exist that the strategy should still be aligned with the requirements of the Military Strategy. The HR Strategy 2010 was developed to meet the HR requirements posed by the Military Strategy and is, as such, fully aligned with and supportive of, the objectives of the Military Strategy. Robust articulation is, however, required to affirm the DOD HR Strategy 2010 as a key Support Strategy and enabler of the SANDF Military Strategy. Without an effective, efficient and economical HR composition having the right people in the right places at the right times, the ends of the Military Strategy, ie to support the people, to provide regional security and to provide defence against aggression, will not be able to be accomplished.
The DOD HR Strategy 2010 provides human resource strategic direction. It is a transformational/change management strategy and not an implementation plan. Therefore, like any other strategy, it should not be equated with an implementation plan. Detailed planning instructions/directives to give effect to the strategy, should be formulated and promulgated as part of the DODís broad transformation and "provide human resources" processes.
THE DOD HUMAN RESOURCE PHILOSOPHY
The DOD wants its HR composition to be competently managed in the interests of both the organisation and the individual and to have an HR composition which is effective, efficient, economical, equitable, motivated, productive and professional. It is therefore developing an institutional culture and occupational ethos based on professional conduct (as well as military professionalism in the case of uniformed personnel), service delivery, individual empowerment and pride in the organisation and its common values. This developing institutional culture and occupational ethos should serve as unifying forces which transcend all potential historically derived divisive factors.
The DOD has a first and foremost responsibility to ensure that its macro-HR management, including the way that personnel serve, is executed in such a way that its corporate mission can be executed in the most effective, efficient and economic way. This calls for a new employment ethos for uniformed personnel which is in line with international practice, discarding the inherited "cradle-to-grave" stagnation-riddled and unproductive employment ethos in favour of a more flexible and developmental-focused way of serving, thereby releasing more funds for operational commitments while also ensuring a regular throughput of well-qualified personnel who, having completed an optimal stint of military duty, can assume meaningful occupations in civilian society and contribute to the strengthening of the economy. Through this new approach, the One Force Model, as expounded in the Defence White Paper and Defence Review, will truly become effective.
The DOD recognises that its outputs depend on the contribution of each individual as well as on the collective efforts of the organisation. Individual empowerment through education, training and development, ranging from pre-employment ETD to post-employment reskilling and reintegration into civilian society, therefore enjoys a high priority to ensure that the DOD has the "right quantity and quality of personnel".
The DOD recognises that current as well as future defence demands will increasingly call for a workforce which is predominantly technology-orientated. It therefore contributes to youth academic development to fulfil its own recruiting needs, at the same also employing all reasonable means to retain scarce expertise, fully cognisant that scarce expertise is a prerequisite to maintain a technologically advanced defence force. Once lost, scarce expertise is very difficult to reacquire and takes a long time to reintegrate into the organisation, thereby presenting a strategic risk.
Finally, the DODís HR philosophy takes into account the need to practice HR management in such a way that the DOD and SANDF will have a well-disciplined, motivated and happy workforce. Without discipline, a military force cannot exist, much less participate in operations and deployments. Without motivation there can be no effective soldiering, or soldiers may find their necessary support lacking. Unless personnel are happy in what they do and in the way that they experience the organisation, there can be no esprit de corps, trust and pride in the organisation.
All leaders and managers in the DOD and SANDF must pledge themselves to practice this HR management philosophy.
THE DOD HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT VISION
The DODís HR management vision is that all commanders, managers and HR functionaries will competently manage the DODís most important asset, its HR. Competent HR management will result in a DOD which comprises an effective, efficient, economical, empowered, motivated, well-managed and diverse workforce, willing and capable of executing the DODís mission.
THE DOD HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT MISSION
The mission of HR management in the DOD is to support the DODís corporate mission and strategy by providing effective, efficient and economic HR of the quality and quantity commensurate with the DODís needs, as regulated by the Constitution, national legislation as well as parliamentary and executive direction.
HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGIC ISSUES
The following HR strategic issues are derived from the current HR realities:
- Strategic Issue 1: Affordability of HR Composition. The current DOD macro-composition is not affordable and constrains defence outputs by usurping funds that could be appropriated for operating purposes.
- Strategic Issue 2: One Force Model. The lack of direction and uncertainty regarding the way that the One Force Model should be applied leads, to the withering away of the SANDFís ResF capacity, which may have serious operational ramifications in future. In addition, it contributes to the employment of an unaffordable number of personnel in the RegF.
- Strategic Issue 3: Force Design, Force Structure and Establishment. The lack of a defined and stable force design, force structure, establishment and comprehensive post profiles hampers the progress of HR transformation and constrains the undertaking of a detailed strategic assessment of the DODís "as is" HR profile, compared to the profile required by the "to be" structure. HR strategic gaps which may become apparent in future, can therefore currently only be estimated.
- Strategic Issue 4: Flexible Service System. The way that the FSS is applied fosters growing rank-age vs mustering discrepancies and ratio distortions, as well as unrealistic expectations of life-long employment with concomitant stagnation and low-morale. It does not provide the SANDF with a cost-effective employment mechanism; nor with the ability to adjust force levels as required, nor with the ability to ensure that the bulk of deployable personnel remains young and fit, nor with the required feeding capacity for the ResF, nor with the ability to answer personnelís expectations to be adequately empowered for future careers in civilian society.
- Strategic Issue 5: Skewed Rank-Age vs Mustering Pyramids. The skewed rank-age vs mustering pyramids result in age discrepancies which, particularly among junior level combat personnel, impair the SANDFís deployment and operational potential.
- Strategic Issue 6: Mobility and Redeployment Mechanisms. There are no sufficient and appropriate enabling mechanisms, including incentives and redeployment mechanisms, to regulate the mobility of personnel in the DOD. The above inadequacies constrain the DODís ability to re-skill and redeploy personnel who can no longer be effectively utilized, to retain scarce expertise, to ensure that both the RegF and the ResF comprise a bulk of young, fit and healthy personnel, and to minimise stagnation.
- Strategic Issue 7: Health Status. The number of SANDF personnel unable to comply with the prescribed health standards is increasing rapidly, thus reducing the operational capability and draining the resources of the SANDF.
- Strategic Issue 8: Pre- and Post-Employment ETD. The lack of an integrated extended ETD system, ranging from pre-employment to post-employment, to marry the DODís/SANDFís unique HR requirements with the broad South African educational, economic and labour realities, contributes to anomalies in and the degeneration of the DODís/SANDFís HR composition. (Pre-employment ETD is required to expedite the normalisation of the representivity imbalance in the DODís/SANDFís specialised occupational classes and musterings. Post-employment ETD is required to rejuvenate the HR composition through the appropriate reskilling and redeployment of personnel whose tenure expires or who can no longer be utilised).
- Strategic Issue 9: Representivity. The representivity imbalance in the DODís highly specialised combat, technical and professional musterings (mostly White); among the DODís middle management (mostly White) and among the SANDFís junior ranks (mostly African) contains several strategic risks. Perceptions of insensitive ratio adjustments on the one hand and too little progress to normalise the imbalance on the other hand, contribute to low-morale, the loss of expertise, disciplinary problems and criminal offences, ultimately withering away the esprit de corps in the DOD.
- Strategic Issue 10: Uniformed Personnel Ė PSAP Divide. Perceptions of discrimination against PSAP and differentiated HR management regulations and practices wrt uniformed personnel and PSAP respectively, are not conducive for the building of morale, cohesion and esprit de corps in the DOD.
- Strategic Issue 11: Loss of Expertise. Since the early 1990ís, the loss of operational and functional expertise continues to hamper the execution of operational commitments. The continuous loss of expertise especially endangers the SANDFís capacity to operate, maintain and support the weapons systems that will result from the SDP acquisitions.
- Strategic Issue 12: Absence of Integrated Learning and Career Pathways. The DOD has not yet attained the position where personnelís learning pathways are structured and developed in tandem with their career pathways. This results in inefficiency and contributes to low-morale.
- Strategic Issue 13: Image of HR Management. Perceptions as well as practices of inefficient HR management and service delivery damage the image of the DODís HR process and, by implication, the internal and external image of the corporate DOD.
- Strategic Issue 14: Lack of a Culture to Practice Sound Labour Relations at All Levels. The unionisation of the uniformed component, in particular, presents a new and relatively untested dimension to HR management in the DOD. The DODís outputs could be impaired unless all personnel are properly educated to practice the rights and duties required for sound labour relations and labour peace.
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS
The following critical success factors are required for the successful implementation of the HR strategic objectives:
- One nodal point to co-ordinate and orchestrate the DODís HR management process, leading towards a single value chain. This is deemed a prerequisite to enable the conclusion of the HR processís transformation and to ensure effective implementation of HR Strategy 2010.
- Competent, fit and healthy personnel who live the DODís values.
- An effective, efficient, economical, defined, stable and visible establishment table that will make the DODís qualitative and quantitative HR requirements, and therefore the HR gaps, visible.
- The availability of post profiles for all posts that will enable the DOD to position "the right personnel in the right posts at the right places at the right times".
- The completion of the current round of the staffing process that will enable the DOD to conduct a strategic assessment on how to manage those personnel who constitute the unplaced pool after the first-round staffing.
- The availability of an appropriate mobility and redeployment mechanism that will enable the DOD to reconfigure its HR composition ito the required ratios, affordability and efficiency.
- The will among all principal stakeholders to implement a mobility and redeployment mechanism.
- The availability of a Redeployment Agency that can continuously facilitate the appropriate reskilling, redeployment and alternative job placement of all personnel whose tenures expire and/or who can no longer be utilised.
- Enabling mechanisms that will make both RegF and ResF service attractive and rewarding and which will enable the SANDF to maintain the required ratios and mobility of personnel.
- The accreditation of the DODís ETD programmes with the SA Qualifications Authority (SAQA), which will, among other benefits, facilitate the redeployment and resettlement of personnel in civilian society.
- The enthusiasm and will among all principal stakeholders, including the trade unions, to make HR Strategy 2010 work. The DODís strategic approach with regard to the trade unions is that they are being regarded as partners that should constructively contribute with the DOD towards ensuring an effective, efficient and economical human resource composition that is characterised by lawful, fair and equitable employment practices that benefit both the State and the individual member/employee.
DESIRED END STATES AND GOALS
The Desired End States state the results that should be obtained by implementing the high level goals. The goals represent the ends which should be achieved to realise the Desired End States. Only once the DOD has realised the Desired End States, will the HR strategic issues be solved and HR Strategy 2010 have reached its aim, ie "to ensure the availability of the right quantity and quality of HR in the right places at the right times, who are effectively, efficiently and economically managed and administered".
- Desired End State 1: A Rejuvenated SANDF HR Composition. "The SANDFís operational requirements are fully met by a RegF and Reserve Force HR composition predominantly consisting of young, fit and healthy personnel who comply with their respective utilisation criteria, throughout their term of service".
- Goals. The desired end state for rejuvenation should be met by achieving the following goals:
- School leavers (ie Grade 12 qualified persons) who join the SANDF (RegF and ResF) are not younger than 18 years and older than 22 years, have passed Grade 12, are preferably single, are not area bound, comply with the SANDF Medical Standards as prescribed by the SAMHS, as well as all other applicable appointment requirements. (Note that tertiary institution qualified persons who are appointed in the SANDF may be older than 22 years, but will still have to comply with the rank-age vs mustering requirements of the respective musterings in which they are appointed).
- The SANDF shall actively recruit in all the provinces and ensure an equitable spread between urban and rural areas. Specific attention shall be given to recruit young Black graduates for the SANDFís highly advanced musterings, whilst specific attention will also be given to recruit more young Whites for the entry level in musterings where there are currently a representivity imbalance (particularly in the SA Army). In all cases, a specific focus will be placed on enhancing the representivity of women.
- Selection processes and assessment centres which determine whether applicants meet entry criteria, shall employ culturally neutral potential and aptitude measuring instruments.
- Each intake of SANDF members is composed in such a way that the intake substantively contributes towards addressing representivity imbalances in those musterings where imbalances still exist. Once imbalances have been corrected in line with policy guidelines (such as the guidelines for race representivity contained in the Defence Review), each intake shall be composed in such a way that it reflects the RSAís broad demographic composition ito approved policy guidelines.
- Forty percent of the SANDFís total RegF HR composition serve in the Military Skills Development System (MSD) (Career Stage 1 of the approved SANDF New Service System) for a period not exceeding two years.
- The MSD guarantees a rapid throughput of young personnel to meet those deployment contingencies that require a large number of young, fit and healthy personnel.
- The bulk of every MSD year group who complete their initial two-year service, transfer to the ResF and are contractually and/or bmo regulation committed to serve in the ResF to ensure its sustained feeding with young, fit and healthy personnel.
- Personnel with the rank of Pte do not serve in the SANDF (RegF and Conventional Reserves) beyond the age of 28 years.
- All RegF junior officers, the majority of middle-ranking officers up to the rank of Maj, and NCOs up to the rank of Staff Sergeant (S Sgt) (where the rank of S Sgt is applicable, read also the equivalent ranks of F Sgt (SAAF) and CPO (SA Navy) serve in the Core Service System (CSS) (Career Stage 2 of the approved SANDF New Service System), with the maximum age limit for CSS service being between 40 to 45 years old.
- Rank-age vs mustering prescripts are strictly applied.
- All RegF personnel and personnel contractually committed to render Reserve Force service, are subject to Concurrent Health Assessments (CHA) and managed according to the findings of the assessments.
- Only officers from the rank of Maj and upwards and NCOs from the rank of S Sgt and upwards with top-level development potential and/or excellent performance records are selected for the RegF Senior Career System (SCS) (Career Stage 3 of the approved SANDF New Service System).
- Should the SANDF decide to accept a younger candidate profile for the Joint Senior Command and Staff program (JSCSP) in line with the international norm, alternative career paths are established for senior officers not selected to undergo JSCSP. (Note: the norm for international candidates attending the equivalent program is 35-year-old Majís as apposed to the current SANDF norm 40-year-old Lieutenant Colonels (Lt Colís/Cdr (SAN) who attend the program).
- The normal retirement age for personnel serving in the SCS varies between the ages of 55 and 60 years, or SCS personnelís retirement date/age is specified in their contract, which could be prior to reaching the age of 55 years.
- To prevent stagnation, a "tenure in rank" policy is in place that specifies the maximum term that can be served in each rank. However special provision is, made to accommodate personnel whose tenures are tied to functional ranks, eg professional health practitioners, pilots etc.
- Ways. The goals to rejuvenate the SANDFís HR composition should be achieved by means of the following:
- Revise the SANDF personnel acquisition policy, stipulating that school leavers (ie Grade 12 qualified persons) will be recruited and appointed only if they are not younger than 18 years and older than 22 years, have passed Grade 12, are not area bound and comply with the SANDF Medical Standards as prescribed by the SAMHS, as well as all other applicable appointment requirements.
- Ensure that selection processes and assessment centres utilise culturally neutral potential and aptitude measuring instruments. Regular research is to be carried out to ensure that the most current and appropriate instruments are being utilised.
- Conduct robust recruiting campaigns to attract young, fit and healthy women and men from all the provinces, with a balance between urban and rural areas. Compose intakes in such a way that they substantively contribute towards addressing representivity imbalances in those musterings where imbalances still exist. Once imbalances have been corrected in line with policy guidelines (such as the guidelines for race representivity contained in the Defence Review), intakes are to be composed in such a way that they reflect the RSAís broad demographic composition ito approved policy guidelines.
- In order to ensure that new recruits fully comply with the definition of "the right quality" contained in this strategy, they are to undergo a Civic Education Programme as part of their initial training. Such a programme should include instilling the Vision, Mission and Values of the DOD, the Code of Conduct and the basic tenets of military professionalism, including respect for the democratic political process, human rights and cultural diversity. The Civic Education Programme should also instil a sense of pride in serving the nation and inspire young Servicewomen and Ėmen to act as role models for their peers in civil society.
- The role of the SANDF in nation building is emphasised during initial training. Young recruits are taught from day one of their training that, as highly disciplined and professional members of the SANDF, they will be serving the security needs of all South Africans and contribute towards a safe environment that is conducive for the development and growth of their country, their region (the Southern African Development Community) and their continent, Africa.
- In order to further contribute towards the institutionalisation of a culture of military professionalism, all new recruits undergo formal tuition in military discipline, whilst their training programmes underscore the necessity of complying with the requirements of military discipline in order to be effective servicewomen and Ėmen, thereby earning respect as role models, citizens in uniform and proud young South Africans.
- Plan and promulgate implementation guidelines to grow the MSD from 2003 to reach an overall SANDF RegF strength of 40% by 2006/07.
- Define the annual absorption capacity / requirements of the CSS for MSD personnel, keeping in mind that the first MSD outflow will occur in December 2004.
- Identify all currently serving Pte in the FTC who are older than 28 years. Register them on a DOD Redeployment Register.
- Develop and promulgate an integrated DOD Redeployment Plan, incorporating profiling (skills requirement assessment), retraining and alternative employment placement to facilitate the redeployment and proper reintegration into civilian society of all Pteís older than 28 years.
- Develop an Exit Management Framework to facilitate an optimal throughput of personnel. The framework should facilitate the redeployment of members whose tenure of service expires or who can no longer be effectively utilised. The Exit Management Framework should, amongst other factors, make provision for appropriate outcomes in terms of pension benefits (portability of benefits from the Government Employees Pension Fund due to the uniqueness of military service); pay in lieu of service (a specified payment for every full year of service completed); leave (payment of all leave due); medical provisions (medical assistance to members in terms of the provisions/regulations applicable to their service before exit); resettlement (one-off resettlement allowance); service bonus (pro-rata); re-integration into civil society (vocational training opportunities); allowing for re-employment by the State in any other State Department or in the SANDF, in exceptional circumstances; and Reserve Force service (members are to be encouraged to join the Reserves).
- Incorporate public-private partnerships and donor goodwill in developing relevant implementation plans.
- Re-skill and redeploy all Pteís older than 28 years at that stage.
- Define/confirm the optimal rank-age vs mustering pyramids for all musterings. Also identify those musterings where the norm can be exceeded.
- Identify all RegF officers who will occupy the rank groups of Maj and higher and NCOs who will occupy the rank groups of S sgt and higher by January 2003. These personnel will be subject to selection for the SCS over the period 2003/05. Those not to be selected for the SCS will have to be redeployed by 2006. Identification is to be done as part of the SCS selection/migration process that will be conducted between 2003-05.
- Identify those officers and NCOs who will exceed their respective rank-age vs mustering pyramids. These personnel will have to be considered for redeployment as part of the implementation of the SANDF New Service System.
- Once approved by the PDSC, apply the rank-age vs mustering pyramids strictly in the RegF and Conventional Reserves.
- Develop and promulgate alternative career models for senior officers who, as a result of age norms, may not be selected to do the JSCSP.
- Develop and promulgate tenure in rank policy that specifies the maximum allowable term of service in each rank. Identify all musterings, wherein personnelís tenure is tied to a functional rank and make special provision to accommodate "tenure in rank" wrt all such musterings. Once approved, apply the policy strictly in conjunction with the rank-age vs mustering norms to manage careers.
- Amend the SANDF retirement regulations so that it makes provision for normal retirement between the age of 55 and 60 years, as well as to accommodate the contractual determination of SCS personnelís retirement date/age, which could be prior to reaching the age of 55 years. Prior to any revision however, investigate the options wrt pensionable benefits which should be applied to accommodate an amendment to the current SANDF retirement regulations without invoking penalisation of benefits due to personnel who would utilise an early exit option.
- All RegF as well as ex-MSD personnel who are contractually committed to render ResF service, are subject to CHA. Career management incorporates the findings of the assessments for career development and utilisation purposes. Apply continuously iro serving RegF personnel and ex-MSD personnel.
- Desired End State 2: An Effective, Efficient and Economical DOD HR Composition. "The DODís HR composition consists of a relatively small FTC and a sufficiently large ResF component required to sustain the force design, while cost-benefit maximising HR practices are employed, thereby releasing sufficient funds for operating and capital requirements".
- Goals. The desired end state for HR affordability should be met by achieving the following goals:
- As an interim measure, personnel expenditure is "pegged" at 45% of the total DOD budget, excluding SDP expenditure. (Fluctuations in the HR requirements of the force design will determine adjustments to this goal. Also see explanatory* note below).
- The most effective, efficient and economic HR ratios are defined and derived from the Defence Review statement to have a "relatively small FTC and a sufficiently large ResF". These include the FTC vs ResF ratio, RegF vs PSAP ratio, rank level ratios, salary level ratios, post level ratios, tooth-to-tail ratios, corps/mustering ratios, duplication of structure ratios and span of control ratios.
- There is an appropriate Mobility and Redeployment Mechanism that enables the DOD to reconfigure its HR composition ito the defined ratios for effectiveness, efficiency and economy.
- Outsourcing of HR services occurs, based upon thorough prior analyses of the true cost-benefit results for the DOD and the DODís capacity to render such services internally.
- Explanatory Note to Affordability Goals. With the current misalignment between defence policy and the budget (ie non-affordability of the force design), the fact that the improvement of service conditions and benefits is automatically added to the defence budget, the fact that the inflator in other areas is not proportionate to that applied to personnel expenditure and the new method of separate funding of the defence packages for specific periods (causing a non-stable defence budget), cause strictly defined ratios for personnel, operating and capital budgeting to be academic and thus will change from time to time. It is therefore improbable that the DOD will reach a stable end-state ratio of 40:30:30, and it can at best attempt to approach this ratio when the budget is viewed over the long term. Staff tests show that 45% is a more realistic target for personnel expenditure.
- Ways. The goals to attain an affordable HR composition should be achieved by means of the following:
- The DOD should "down manage" its corporate Personnel expenditure to reach a maximum of 45% of the total departmental budget allocation by 2006/07. (Note: Some Services and Divisions will be able to "down manage" to even below 45%, but in other cases this will not be practical and/or feasible). The DOD should work towards the new target, once the 45% pegging limit has been approved by the PDSC.
- Short and medium term HR plans should project how the "down management" is planned and scheduled, taking into account the provisions contained in the new service system. The "down management" programme must be reflected in Short and Medium Term HR Plans.
- The most effective, efficient and economic HR ratios must be defined, including the FTC vs ResF ratio, RegF vs PSAP ratio, rank level ratios, salary level ratios, post level ratios, tooth-to-tail ratios, corps/mustering ratios, duplication of structure ratios and span of control ratios that are desirable and will soonest lead to the attainment of a corporate 45% Personnel expenditure.
- HR services are outsourced or entrusted to alternative service delivery only when particular service rendering cannot be performed by the DOD as a result of lack of capacity and in cases where the cost of outsourcing is less than would be the case if services are rendered internally. When HR services are outsourced or entrusted to alternative service delivery, preference is given to public-private partnerships within the provisions of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (Act No 5 of 2000), in order to benefit historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIís).
- Desired End State 3: A Practiced One Force Model. "Force development and force employment reflect the adequate resourcing and utilisation of both the RegF and the ResF, which have led to the establishment of a strategic force level adjustment capability at affordable cost".
- Goals. The desired end state for the One Force Model should be met by achieving the following goals:
- Ito the One Force Model, the ResF is incorporated, managed, budgeted and planned for in the DODís force design and "strategic direction process".
- The ResF is managed as an integral part of the DODís "provide HR" process.
- The ResFís budget/resource allocation is sufficient to ensure that it can function effectively ito the One Force Model and that it can be a reliable guarantor of trained, ready and cost effective HR especially to provide young, fit and healthy combat personnel and highly skilled expertise to supplement shortages in the RegF.
- The MSD is the primary feeder source of the ResF and has the long term potential to channel up to approximately 8 000 new personnel to the ResF on an annual basis, if required.
- ResF units contribute substantially to the recruitment of personnel for the MSD intakes. Some personnel are selected during MSD service for service in the RegF (CSS), but the majority revert to ResF service upon completing their MSD term.
- MSD personnel have a contractual commitment, or are required bmo regulation, to serve and train in the ResF upon completion of MSD service, thereby creating the capacity for the ResF to be a guarantor of trained, ready and cost effective HR.
- The ResF ensures the proper integration, administration, ETD and ResF career development of personnel who completed their MSD service.
- The ResF, in close collaboration with the DOD Redeployment Agency, establishes partnerships with organised business to facilitate civilian employment opportunities for ResF members.
- There is a voluntary cadet system (not school cadets) that makes provision for the affiliation of young people to ResF units. The ResF actively contributes towards youth development through activities that may include adventure training and leadership development and the creation of a positive image of the DOD among the youth.
- There is a tertiary education grant system for advanced training, interlinked with ResF service commitments, based upon the USA ROTC scheme. The aim of this grant system is to serve as an incentive for ResF service, to rejuvenate the ResFís leadership and to supplement the SANDFís scarce highly skilled combat and technical pool of expertise. This grant system is available for high performing school leavers who sign up with the ResF and who want to be qualified in disciplines that will benefit the SANDFís advanced combat and technical domains. Personnel utilising this system will have to pass officerís selection and will have a specific ResF service commitment.
- The operational impact of RegF personnelís health status is largely addressed through the optimal force preparation and utilisation of the ResF (the ResF is able to present a larger pool of trained, young, fit and healthy personnel than the RegF).
- Force development programmes make optimal provision for force preparation and force structuring of the ResF.
- The service conditions, incentives and benefits offered for ResF service, attract and retain a sufficient quality and quantity of personnel.
- Ways. The goals to implement the One Force Model should be achieved by means of the following:
- The Military Strategy should indicate the envisaged force design for the ResF and the envisaged role of the ResF.
- The SANDFís Force Preparation Strategy and Force Employment Strategy should provide clear guidelines on the integration and utilisation of the Reserve Force within the context of the One Force Concept.
- Each Service / Division, as applicable, is to present to the PDSC its current interpretation, vision and expectations of the One Force Model, within the context of the uniqueness of each Service and the provisions of the approved SANDF New Service System. Specific clarity needs to be obtained regarding the envisaged future role of the ResF in each Service. This will serve to clarify and affirm what is desirable and practically achievable through the One Force Model. It will also serve as a critical input for the future interrelationship between the RegF and the ResF.
- Investigate the requirement for, and the gaps in, ResF representation within the SANDFís strategy and planning directorates. Identify and attach ResF officers to these directorates to participate in the development of strategy, budgets and plans as and where required. This will give effect to the following statement contained in Chapter 11, par 45, of the Defence Review: "For the One Force Concept to become a reality, more PTC officers and warrant officers should become eligible for promotion into senior command structures with status equal to their FTC counterparts. This will demonstrate that they have a meaningful role to play in the management of the SANDF" [in so far as this relates to the requirements posed by the One Force Model].
- The results of an affordability analysis should indicate the appropriate personnel budget allocation ratio for the RegF and the ResF. Once approved, the respective down-and-up-scaling of the two components must be implemented to bring about a total Personnel expenditure not exceeding 45% of the corporate DODís budget.
- Define the annual absorption capacity / requirements of the ResF for MSD personnel, keeping in mind that the first MSD outflow of personnel with a contractual commitment for ResF training/service will occur during December 2004 and that MSD outflows will progressively grow thereafter. An accurate requirement projection, interlinked with the ResFís role, is a critical input to determine the size of the annual MSD intakes.
- All Services should identify units per province to act as nodes for the recruitment of MSD personnel.
- Integrate the ResF-node, MSD recruitment process with the Directorate Personnel Acquisition (D Pers Acq) MSD recruitment process. Both D Pers Acq and identified ResF units should recruit for the first MSD intake (January 2003) and subsequent intakes.
- Define MSD personnelís contractual commitment / requirement ito regulation to train and serve in the ResF upon completion of MSD service. Align with existing legal and regulatory framework provisions, or amend the Defence Act and relevant regulations to accommodate the contractual commitment / requirement to serve. Keep in mind the first MSD outflow during December 2004. Promulgate MSD personnelís ResF commitment and contractual provisions in time to advise those candidates recruited for the January 2003 intake.
- All Services should identify ResF units per province to act as acceptance/mother/administrative/home units for personnel who completed their MSD service. Such units must have the required capacity ito personnel and infrastructure to manage the annual inflow of ex-MSD personnel, to ensure their proper integration into civilian society and their continued ResF career development and utilisation. Where capacity lacks, reprioritisation of Servicesí resources should be effected. Services should keep in mind the ideal that the recruitment unit should also be the acceptance/administrative unit.
- Develop an appropriate voluntary cadet system (not school cadets) that makes provision for the affiliation of young people to select ResF units. This system should actively contribute towards youth development through activities that may include adventure training and leadership development and the creation of a positive image of the DOD among the youth.
- Develop a tertiary education grant system for advanced training (along the lines of the USA ROTC), interlinked with ResF service commitments, to serve as an incentive for ResF service; to rejuvenate the ResF leadership and to supplement the SANDFís scarce highly skilled combat and technical expertise pool.
- Investigate and develop appropriate service conditions, including benefits and incentives, for ResF service with particular emphasis on how to attract the youth, with specific reference to youth from historically disadvantaged communities, and scarce expertise needed by the SANDF.
- In conjunction with the DOD Redeployment Agency, establish formal partnerships with organised business and other relevant stakeholders to facilitate employment opportunities for ResF members.
- Desired End State 4: A New Way that Members Serve. "The new service system implemented by the SANDF has substantially reduced personnel expenditure and the investment risk in HR, while it curbed the aging of the force and stagnation. The way that the new service system is managed, forms the primary means through which the SANDF maintains a state of representivity that broadly reflects the demographic composition of the RSA, particularly in respect of race, at all levels and in all musterings, as stated in the Defence Review, Chapter 10, par 55. The range of material rewards, developmental benefits, flexible contracts and beneficial exit options offered to all members, make military service in the RegF and the Reserves attractive".
- Goals. The desired end state for the new way that members serve should be met by achieving the following goals:
- The DOD has the capacity to phase in the new service system, ie reduced personnel numbers and HR budget and increased training and infrastructure capacity.
- There is a comprehensive communication plan to market the new service system internally and externally before implementation commences.
- The SANDF New Service System is completely developed and phased in over the period 2002/03 to 2006/07.
- New general conditions of service and service benefits are developed.
- The DOD personnel and salary system is adapted to handle the new service system requirements and the migration of personnel from the current components to the new service system components.
- New career models which are interlinked with the new service system and which are configured ito integrated learning pathways and career pathways, are developed for officers and NCOs.
- Personnel currently serving in the RegF (STS, MTS and LTS) have either migrated to the SANDF New Service System, or have been re-skilled, redeployed and properly re-integrated into civilian society by 2006/07.
- The IMS is discontinued by 2003.
- The current STS, MTS and LTS are phased out, in conjunction with the phasing in of the CSS and SCS.
- The provisions of the new service system components determine which serving personnel migrate to which new components and which personnel are being re-skilled and redeployed.
- The MSD comprises 40% of the total SANDF RegF by 2006/07 (Services and Divisions will configure their internal component mix according to their respective needs, but the joint HR planning process must result in a total MSD complement of 40% of the RegF).
- There is an annual MSD intake that ensures sufficient young, fit and healthy personnel for deployments, junior leader training as well as the proper feeding of the CSS and the ResF.
- The ResF is adequately resourced and prepared to accept, ETD and utilise the annual outflow of MSD personnel who have completed their MSD service and who become contractually committed for ResF service.
- Foundation training complements the feeding source with sufficient young personnel with the required educational profile for selection and appointment in the SANDFís highly specialised musterings which require specified symbols in mathematics and physical science.
- To meet the objectives of the New Service System, all personnel who join the SANDF (RegF) are "being prepared from Day 1 to leave the SANDF". There is therefore a comprehensive redeployment and reintegration system that makes provision for the skills assessment, retraining, social integration and alternative employment placement of personnel who can no longer be utilised.
- There is a fully supported and best-practice managed DOD Redeployment Agency, based on the model of public-private partnerships, to offer a professional, sustained and seamless counseling, career advice, aptitude and potential assessment, retraining, social integration and alternative employment placement service.
- SANDF personnelís prior learning and experience are accredited and certificated to provide formal recognition for alternative employment placement purposes.
- The CSS comprises 40% of the RegF by 2006/07 (Services and Divisions will configure their internal component mix according to their respective needs, but the joint HR planning process must result in a total CSS complement of 40% of the RegF).
- The CSS provides the bulk of the RegF command cadre, junior to middle level management and highly skilled HR up to the rank levels of Col and S sgt. Flexible service contracts ranging from 4,6,8,10, 12 to 15 years at a time, coupled to integrated reskilling for re-entry into civilian society, prevent stagnation in this component.
- Flexible service contracts are strictly managed ito the available budget, age-rank requirements per mustering as well as personnelís compliance with all the prescribed criteria for their respective utilisation.
- Appropriate retention bonuses and other special incentives are offered to retain personnel serving in all critical combat, technical and professional musterings.
- Not more than 10% of all Pteís in the RegF are employed as Enlisted Personnel in the CSS. They may apply for officerís training or junior leader training while serving in the CSS, but their service is contractually terminated if they are still Pteís by the age of 28 years.
- A new rank structure is applied to Enlisted Personnel, comprising the ranks of Pte First Class and Master Pte. The new rank structure serves as a motivational factor for Enlisted Personnel and is also linked to remuneration increments.
- To attain the desired results wrt flexibility and skills retention, an attractive exit management benefit package is in place for CSS personnel.
- All CSS personnel whose contracts expire and who are not granted new contracts, are able to benefit from appropriate vocational training to ease their re-entry into the civilian job market.
- No personnel serve in the CSS beyond the age of 45 years, whereupon those personnel with the best development potential and/or performance record are selected for SCS service. The remainder are re-skilled and re-deployed.
- The SCS comprises not more than 20% of the RegF by 2006/07 (Services and Divisions will configure their internal component mix according to their respective needs, but the joint HR planning process must result in a total SCS complement of 20% of the RegF).
- Early retirement incentives and exit management benefits are in place to prevent stagnation and to facilitate the tenure in rank policy for the SCS.
- The full implementation of the SANDFís new service system enables the DOD to reduce personnel expenditure to at least 45% of the total defence budget by FY 2006/07 (excluding the Strategic Defence Package), compared to the current 52%. Reduced personnel expenditure is in compliance with the Public Finance Management Act (Act 1 of 1999) that calls for effective, efficient and economical outputs and in compliance with military needs for a reduced, but more effective, efficient and representative human resource composition. This is the result of the migration from the current service system to the new service system over the period up to FY 2006/07. A comparative model that indicates projected savings that should result from the full implementation of the new service system, is presented below. The model is based on average costs for a total full-time DOD human resource composition of 70 000 personnel, which is considered to be a viable Full-time Component to support the force design and force structure, as envisaged in the Defence Review, Chapter 10, par 39.5. The derived force design and force structure should lead to an approved post establishment table that is the starting point for HR Strategy 2010 to give effect to the required quality an quantity of the DODís human resource.
Current Service System Configuration
New Service System Configuration
Strength as at 15 Jan 03
No of Pers
70 000 model
% of Total Full-time Compo-nent (DAP and PSAP)
Average Cost of
70 000 model (projected in 2002 Rand value)
No of Pers
70 000 model
% of Total Full-time Compo-nent (DAP and PSAP)
Average Cost (projected in 2002 Rand value)
2 732 918 312
15,71% (note 1)
1 186 321 266
1 715 769 512
31,42% (note 2)
1 507 845 230
247 873 136
31,42% (note 3)
644 178 562
5 364 120
982 445 328
982 445 328
5 684 370 408
4 320 790 386
Note 1: The SCS comprises 20% of the Regulars (full-time uniformed component).
2: The CSS comprises 40% of the Regulars (full-time uniformed component).
3: The MSD comprises 40% of the Regulars (full-time uniformed component).
4: The projected savings resulting from full implementation of the new service system, as indicated above, is R1 363 580 022 per year, ie amounting to a reduction of 23,9% in the personnel budget.
Defence Review, Military Strategy and Force Employment Strategy.
All entities entrusted with the execution of this strategy should note that the non-realisation of the above projected savings due to any pause in implementing the new service system, will unavoidably lead to a continuous deterioration in the DODís ability to deliver. More funds will have to be spent on an increasingly ineffective and inefficient workforce that is aging and incurring higher health liabilities inherent in aging, at the cost of force preparation and operational deployments. The SANDF will face "block obsolescence" with regard to personnel. In addition, improvements of service conditions and benefits are automatically added to the defence budget, while the inflator in other areas is not proportionate to that applied to personnel expenditure. In order for the SANDF to retain any semblance of viability, the only remedy will then be a substantially enhanced Defence Budget to carry both the current personnel corps and to phase in large numbers of young and fit members within a very short timeframe, whilst also meeting continuing operating costs and capital renewal needs.
Ways. The goals to implement a new way that members serve should be achieved by means of the following:
Develop a SANDF New Service System Implementation Plan, covering the period 2003 to 2007, that details the discontinuation of the current service system components (IMS/STS/MTS/LTS) and the phasing in of the new components (MSD/CSS/SCS). The plan must include a Migration Sub Plan, detailing the migration of serving personnel to the New Service System.
Develop a pre-communication plan as well as a continuous communication plan to market the New Service System among all DOD personnel (including the ResF), stakeholders and the general public before implementation of the new system.
The Short and Medium Term HR plans of all Budget Holders must incorporate the migration to the New Service System. Short and Medium Term HR Plans must reflect migration to the New Service System from 2002/03 onwards.
Develop new service contracts and general conditions of service / service benefits for the MSD, CSS and SCS in line with the provisions of the New Service System components.
Adapt the DOD personnel and salary system to handle the requirements of the New Service System, with specific reference to the phasing out of the current service system, the phasing in of the New Service System, transitional "overlapping" and the migration of all serving FTC uniformed personnel to the New Service System.
Develop new career models for officers and NCOs, in the case of NCOs these are to be analogous to the current career development model for officers, but must also configure all the career models so that learning pathways and career pathways are integrated. Interlink the development with the requirements of the New Service System.
Discontinue the IMS.
Execute the phasing out of the STS, MTS and LTS.
Institute the MSD, CSS and SCS.
Expand the MSD to comprise 40% of the uniformed FTC by 2006/07 (Services and Divisions will configure their internal component mix according to their respective needs, but the joint HR planning process must result in a total MSD complement of 40% of the RegF).
Configure the CSS to comprise 40% of the uniformed FTC by 2006/07 (Services and Divisions will configure their internal component mix according to their respective needs, but the joint HR planning process must result in a total CSS complement of 40% of the RegF).
Configure the SCS to comprise 20% of the uniformed FTC by 2006/07 (Services and Divisions will configure their internal component mix according to their respective needs, but the joint HR planning process must result in a total SCS complement of 20% of the RegF).
Budget for the expansion of the DOD YFTP to grow by at least 100 additional learners per year (stabilising at 500 new learners per year), until the racial representivity ratios amongst the junior rank groups (Second Lieutenant (2Lt)/Ensign to Captain (Capt)/Lieutenant (SAN)) in the highly specialised combat and technical musterings have been met (the upward mobility of these rank groups, fast tracking and other measures should see to the continuous improvement of representivity at the higher rank levels). Services / Divisions should also identify possible YFTP requirements to be met wrt highly specialised PSAP occupational classes. The DOD must not be found wanting in not having "gone the extra mile" to address this situation, as far as its resources allow. Participating Services and Divisions, in conjunction with CJ Trg, to budget progressively to accommodate increasing numbers of YFTP learners and reflect this in their Short and Medium Term HR Plans from 2002/03.
Develop a cost-effective advanced training programme, conceptually similar to the DOD YFTP that makes provision for the generic training of specified categories of apprentices. The thrust would be that school leavers will be sponsored by the DOD to undergo apprenticeship training (presented ito a joint venture between the DOD and a private partner), while not yet being employed by the DOD. Cost savings, risk reduction and return on investment will be similar to that of the YFTP. Practical phases should be done at DOD establishments, with such learners either being civilians or serving as ResF personnel. Upon earning their Trade Certificate, the DOD will select and appoint them as artisans in the CSS.
Establish a DOD Redeployment Agency, based on the model of public-private partnerships, to offer best-practice and sustained skills assessment/retraining/social re-integration/alternative employment service for all CSS personnel whose contracts expire and who can no longer be utilised in the SANDF.
Develop a programme to educate all SANDF RegF personnel (especially future MSD and CSS personnel) regarding preparation to leave the RegF after having completed a contractual term/s of military service. The focus should be to orientate personnel towards continuous learning and development and to schedule them for developmental opportunities in preparation to leave the RegF upon completion of their service contracts. Personnel should be sufficiently empowered to successfully re-integrate into civilian society and to actively participate in the economy. The programme should unambiguously communicate that the SANDF can offer careers until retirement to only a fraction of personnel with the best development potential and/or performance records.
Accredit and certificate SANDF membersí prior learning and experience. Develop an accreditation and certification strategy and plan with timeframes, given that accreditation and certification will have to be in place by the time that the CSS is implemented, in order to facilitate the effective redeployment of members whose terms of service are to expire in the new service system.
Develop a sub-system within the CSS to make provision for Enlisted Personnel. Include the development of a new rank and benefits structure to apply to Enlisted Personnel. Also identify the posts to be filled by Enlisted Personnel.
Develop an appropriate and attractive exit management dispensation for CSS personnel. The focus should be on the facilitation of reskilling and an appropriate exit benefits package.
Develop early retirement incentives for SCS personnel.
Desired End State 5: An Optimally Representative DOD. "The DOD is broadly representative of all South Africaís citizens at all levels and in all occupational classes and musterings. HR practice now concentrates on maintaining an equitable equilibrium".
Goals. The desired end state for representivity should be met by achieving the following goals:
- Irrespective of the size of the stable end-state force design and force structure and the resulting personnel numbers required, the composition of the Regulars (full-time uniformed component) shall consist of 20% Senior Career System, 40% Core Service System and 40% Military Skills Development System. This configuration is deemed the most appropriate for an effective, efficient and economical human resource composition, the curbing of stagnation, aging and low morale. This configuration is furthermore indispensable to meet military utilisation requirements for a predominantly youthful and vibrant force that is endowed with the capacity to execute the DODís mission as required by the Constitution, White Paper on Defence,
the Defence Review representivity guideline of 64,68% Africans; 10,22% Coloureds; 0,75% Indians and 24,35% Whites at all levels (note that the HR composition within the respective Services and Divisions will be influenced by, amongst other factors, their provincial concentration and the rate at which highly specialised musterings can be filled).
The numeric group targets for race, gender and disabled persons are defined for each level and each mustering / occupational class. These targets are based upon the unique requirements and realities of the military. Targets are included in Servicesí and Divisonsí HR plans.
HR policies, particularly policies on recruitment, selection, placement, ETD and promotion, promote the affirmation of Blacks, women and disabled persons.
Ways. The goals to implement representivity should be achieved by means of the following:
Continuously implement and communicate the approved DOD Affirmative Action Plan.
Servicesí and Divisionsí Short and Medium Term Plans should indicate racial over-representation and under-representation imbalances/gaps at the various levels and in the various musterings and ways to address these. Plan continuously. Reflect objectives in Short and Medium Term HR Plans.
The DOD requires an international comparative study on the status of gender representivity in the military. The Public Service guideline of a 30% female representivy at management level (Director and above) by 1999 has not been attained by the DOD and clearly cannot be attained over the medium term, because of the SANDFís dependence on HR feeding progression through the military structures.
Apply the DODís approved HR policies on recruitment (with the inclusion of "talent scouting" within the public and private sectors, youth foundation training and the recruitment of tertiary qualified Designated Persons), selection, placement, ETD, promotion, coaching, mentoring, fast tracking and succession planning to promote the affirmation of Blacks, women and disabled persons. These measures should, in an expeditious manner, effect a broad representation as per the Defence Review guidelines at all levels and in all musterings and post classes, in order that representivity can be normalised.
Desired End State 6: Excellent HR Service Delivery: "DOD personnel experience HR service delivery to be qualitatively on par with international best practice standards. The HR function has the required capacity to render prompt and efficient service, based on an ethos of client satisfaction".
Goals. The desired end state for HR service delivery should be met by achieving the following goals:
- The affirmation of Blacks, women and disabled persons is institutionalised in the DOD.
- The DODís macro HR composition is broadly representative of the RSAís population in compliance with
Develop an HR efficiency and productivity enhancement plan, as well as an HR management and administration standards enhancement plan.
Develop a plan and programme to enhance the general HR management competencies of commanders, managers and supervisors, as well as the specialist HR competencies of HR functionaries.
Benchmark the relevance and quality of HR functionariesí ETD with that of appropriate modern defence forces.
Develop a plan to adapt the ETD of HR functionaries to be in line with that practised in appropriate benchmarked defence forces. Present new ETD models for HR functionaries (officers and NCOs as well as PSAP) that incorporates compulsory tertiary education (certificate, diploma and degree courses for the various levels).
Conduct an HR policy audit to identify domains where DOD HR policy, as well as AOT HR policy, are absent, insufficient or outdated.
Establish a standard DOD IT database that records and tracks the status of and progress made to address ministerial enquiries, questions in parliament, grievances and complaints. The database should facilitate prompt progress feedback to personnel concerned.
Develop an integrated, standard, user-friendly new-generation HR IT system, including a management information system, HR planning and budgeting tool and HR "self-service" kiosks.
Desired End State 7: Harmony Between the Uniformed and Civilian Components. "Significant alignment has occurred between the differentiating provisions that govern uniformed and civilian personnel, respectively, as well as between the differentiating HR management practices applied to the respective components. While recognising the unique identity and requirements of both components, there is no differentiated treatment ito generic HR management and administrative practice".
Goals. The desired end state for uniform-civilian harmony should be met by achieving the following goals:
- There is a single-point HR management responsibility to co-ordinate and orchestrate the DODís and SANDFís corporate HR management.
- All DOD and SANDF personnel practise an ethos of excellent client- orientated service delivery.
- There is an HR efficiency and productivity enhancement plan as well as an HR management and administration standards enhancement plan.
- The general HR management competencies of commanders and managers / supervisors, as well as the specialist HR competencies of HR functionaries lead to client satisfaction and improved morale, resulting in enhanced individual and organisational outputs.
- The ETD of HR functionaries complies with best practice standards.
- There are comprehensive, up to date, user-friendly, expertly communicated and easily accessible Departmental HR policies, as well as AOT HR policies that cover all the "provide HR process" sub-process domains.
- Command communication is enhanced through a standard DOD IT database that records and tracks the status and progress made to address ministerial enquiries, questions in parliament, grievances and complaints.
- There is an integrated, standard, modern and user-friendly computerised HR management system, including a management information system, HR planning tool and HR administration "self-service" kiosks.
- Ways. The goals to implement HR service delivery should be achieved by means of the following:
- Investigate options to establish a single-point HR management responsibility to co-ordinate and orchestrate the DODís and SANDFís corporate HR management process.
- Develop a plan and programme to institutionalise an ethos of excellent client-orientated service delivery among all DOD and SANDF personnel. The plan and programme should include the robust internal marketing, implementation and measuring of the Public Serviceís "Batho Pele" ("People First") service delivery campaign.
Ways. The goals to implement uniform-civilian harmony should be achieved by means of the following:
- There is significant alignment between the regulatory provisions that govern the DODís uniformed and civilian components.
- Common / generic HR management and administrative matters pertaining to both the DODís uniformed and civilian components are governed by non-differentiating HR practices.
- There are non-differentiating HR systems, processes and procedures pertaining to the common / generic management and administration of the DODís uniformed and civilian components.
- The DOD practices an ethos of "zero tolerance" towards any form of unfair discrimination against any of its HR components.
- There are appropriate and focused ETD programmes to uplift PSAP functioning at levels 1 to 3.
Desired End State 8: Retained Operational and Functional Expertise. "The challenging environment offered by the continuous modernisation of the SANDFís technology and the advantageous provisions offered by the SANDFís new service system, attract expertise in general and serve to retain those categories deemed difficult to replace".
Goals. The desired end state for the retention of expertise should be met by achieving the following goals:
- Investigate the feasibility, including benefits and risks, of possible closer alignment between the differentiating regulatory provisions that govern the DODís uniformed and civilian components.
- Investigate which generic, but currently differentiated, HR management and administrative practices can be configured ito a common approach to be applied to both the uniformed and PSAP components.
- Investigate perceived and real discrimination against the DODís PSAP by means of an up-to-date effect analysis survey.
- Investigate the upliftment needs amongst PSAP employed at levels 1 to 3. Include profiling / skills assessment. Compile appropriate ETD programmes to address the identified upliftment needs among this category of personnel.
Ways. The goals to implement the retention of expertise should be achieved by means of the following:
Define the DODís "critical" combat, technical and professional musterings that experience high turnovers and a significant loss of expertise.
Develop appropriate retention bonuses, production bonuses and other incentives to retain RegF personnel and PSAP serving in all the defined critical combat, technical and professional musterings.
Conduct regular research to ensure that remunerative measures that have been implemented to attract and retain scarce expertise, remain current and appropriate. Adjust measures accordingly.
Develop appropriate service conditions, including benefits and incentives, for ResF service, with particular emphasis on how to attract the youth, with specific reference to historically disadvantaged individuals, to the ResF to supplement the scarce expertise needed by the SANDF.
Stimulate the youthís awareness of, and interest in, the aerospace, maritime and all other relevant technological domains to ensure that the DOD/SANDF attracts the right candidates with an established predisposition towards these domains who want to be pilots, naval combat officers, engineers, etc.
Establish an Advanced Employment Agency Mechanism to source and place scarce expertise (in view of the maintenance situation of new arms acquisitions) and to provide short notice surge capacity that may be required for certain deployments.
Desired End State 9: Labour Peace. "Sound labour relations practice is embedded in HR management at all levels in the DOD, resulting in all parties to the labour relationship satisfying most of their needs by reaching organisational objectives under conditions of labour peace".
Goals. The desired end state for labour peace should be met by achieving the following goals:
- The DOD acquires and retains the appropriate operational and functional expertise to sustain the force design, in the most effective, efficient and economical way.
- Expertise is drawn from the RegF, the ResF and the PSAP component.
- There are attractive and appropriate incentives and service benefits for both uniformed personnel and PSAP to attract and retain the required expertise.
- There is an Advanced Employment Agency Mechanism to source and place scarce expertise (in view of the maintenance situation of new arms acquisitions) and to provide surge capacity that may be required for certain deployments.
- The DOD is a high-order employer of choice for top performing school leavers.
- The DODís pool of operational and functional expertise is optimally representative and reflects the composition of the RSAís population in all musterings and at all levels.
Ways. The goals to implement labour peace should be achieved by means of the following:
- There is an independent DOD Service Commission / Defence Remuneration Board, analogous to the "Armed Forces Pay Review Body" in the United Kingdom, which is properly mandated and empowered to make periodic recommendations to Parliament regarding the appropriate Service Conditions, including pay, and Service Benefits for various categories of military service / ranks / musterings. This is necessary in order to attract and retain scarce expertise, especially in view of the staffing requirements that the main equipment being acquired through the Strategic Defence Package, will pose and in view of the fact that the DOD finds it difficult to retain scarce expertise due to the more lucrative remuneration offered by private industry.
- The Regulatory Framework is amended to make provision for a DOD Service Commission/"Defence Remuneration Board".
- Line management at all levels practise sound labour relations as an integral part of their HR management function.
- All DOD/SANDF personnel, particularly at the lower/junior levels, understand at least the "basics" of sound labour relations, including their rights and duties within the DOD/SANDF context.
- There is a DOD Labour Relations Centre of Excellence to manage corporate labour relations on a full-time basis, including conducting negotiations with trade unions and providing specialist advice and support to all commanders and managers.
- Amend the regulatory framework to make provision for the establishment of a properly mandated and empowered independent DOD Service Commission / Defence Remuneration Board.
- Empower all commanders and managers to practise sound labour relations through focused ETD programmes. Present (internal) short courses / seminars on labour relations management to all commanders and managers at all levels.
- Educate, train and develop all DOD/SANDF personnel, particularly at the lower/junior levels, regarding their labour rights and duties in the DOD/SANDF. Present internal programmes on labour relations management to DOD/SANDF personnel at all levels.
- Establish a DOD Labour Relations Centre of Excellence to manage corporate labour relations on a full-time basis, including conducting negotiations with trade unions and providing specialist advice and support to all commanders and managers.
The attainment of the nine desired end states described above should lead to the Strategy achieving its aim "to ensure the establishment of the most effective, efficient and economical Defence HR composition, of the right quantity and quality in the right places at the right times".
Most of the ways to achieve the stated goals will require significant effort and the will to execute. The success of this strategy is dependent on the support of all commanders and managers at all levels, as well as the support of stakeholders in civil society. As a result of fundamental transformational change that the implementation of the strategy will bring about, it is envisaged that the DOD will engage principal stakeholders in a participative interaction mode as implementation unfolds.
A detailed HR Strategic Implementation Plan will be promulgated to guide execution of this strategy.
A: A Critique of Human Resource Strategy 2010 Within the Context of the
SANDFís Readiness Levels. 2003. Parliamentary Information Services Research: Cape Town
B: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
C: Decision Brief to the Council on Defence on a New Service System Concept for Defence Act Personnel (DS/CPP/D HR PLAN/R/104/31 dd 27 October 2000)
D: Defence Act, 1957 (Act No 44 of 1957, as amended)
E: Department of Defence Affirmative Action Plan
F: Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act No 55 of 1998)
G: General Regulations for the SA National Defence Force and the Reserve
H: Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No 66 of 1995)
I: National Treasury Instructions
J: Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No 1 of 1999)
K: Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation 103 of 1994, as amended)
L: Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1994 (Act No 105 of 1994)
M: Public Service Regulations
N: South African Defence Review, 1998
O: South African National Defence Force Personnel Strategy: 1996/7 Cycle (CSP/D PERS PLAN/C/501/6 dd 29 May 1996)
P: South African White Paper on Defence, 1996
Q: White Paper on Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity
R: White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service, 1995